


NLS CONGRESS 2026

BIBLIOGRAPHY

VARITY

Variations of Truth in Psychoanalysis



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VARITY

Variations of Truth in Psychoanalysis



The Empire of Light, René Magritte

- 1 – History, Myth and Fiction
- 2 – Mistake, Lie and Evasion
- 3 – Fake and Transparency
- 4 – Knowledge: True and False
- 5 – Lifting the Veil, Revelation, Emergence
- 6 – Study: Truth, Speech and Saying

The invitation to participate in the team of readers for the Bibliography for the forthcoming NLS Congress 2026 was accepted by many colleagues, new and less new to the work in our School, with a lot of enthusiasm.

Starting from each one's personal selection of suggestions of texts and books - (only those published in English) by Freud, Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller and Éric Laurent related to the theme of Variations of Truth – a list of over 140 proposed titles was compiled. Then, twenty-three readers took as many texts as they wanted under their wing to extract quotes.

The orientation guiding the selection of quotes was very clear:

Be selective. Keep it short. Choose interesting quotes. Choose the surprise.


Let us imagine ourselves as the reader of the bibliography. We prefer a document that is engaging and easy to consult; with entries that we are delighted to discover or rediscover.

A small editing team, Dana Tor, Anna de Filippi and I, made sure the selection was a good representation of the variety in which the theme of Varsity could be interpreted. The rubric titles for the Blog helped us group together categories of themes. We observed the principle of the not all: not all texts would ultimately be usable, not all quotes would be chosen. Leaning on Patricia Bosquin-Caroz' congress argument, certain texts and quotes opened very enriching reflections about "truth". The term had to be situated again and again in its proper symbolic dimension. We re-distributed quotes to this rubric or another, we cut those that repeated a similar thought or were not concise, and we made any editorial decisions together, letting the variety of truths find their expression.

And so, with the diligent work of a bunch of keen readers we were able to deliver not only a functional and reliable bibliography, but one we enjoyed and that we are proud to offer to everyone in our community and beyond.

Wishing you an interesting read, in preparation for your submissions of a short text for the blog or a case study for the Congress!

Natalie Wülfing



Remembrance of a Voyage, René Magritte

1 – History, Myth and Fiction

SIGMUND FREUD

I no longer believe in my neurotica [theory of the neuroses. [...] I will begin historically [and tell you] where the reasons for disbelief came from. [...] Then, third, the certain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect. (Accordingly, there would remain the solution that the sexual fantasy invariably seizes upon the theme of the parents).

Freud, S., "Letter from Freud to Fliess, September 21, 1897" (1897), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume I*, London: Hogarth Press, 1966, p. 259.

There is in general no guarantee of the data produced by our memory.

Freud, S., "Screen Memories" (1899), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume III*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 315.

[T]he falsified memory is the first that we become aware of: the raw material of memory-traces out of which it was forged remains unknown to us in its original form.

Freud, S., "Screen Memories" (1899), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume III*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 322.

It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all *from* our childhood: memories *relating to* our childhood may be all that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, *emerge*; they were *formed* at that time.

Freud, S., "Screen Memories" (1899), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume III*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 322.

For this reason, it not uncommonly happens that obsessional neurotics, who are troubled with self-reproaches but have connected their affects with the wrong causes, will also tell the physician the true causes, without any suspicion that their self-reproaches have simply become detached from them. In relating such an incident they will sometimes add with astonishment or even with an air of pride: 'But I think nothing of that.'

Freud, S., "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," (1909), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume X*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 197.

This is often the way in which childhood memories originate. Quite unlike conscious memories from the time of maturity, they are not fixed at the moment of being experienced and afterwards repeated, but are only elicited at a later age when childhood is already past; in the process they are altered and falsified, and are put into the service of later trends, so that generally speaking they cannot be sharply distinguished from phantasies.

Freud, S., "Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood" (1910), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1957, p. 83.

The unconscious impulses do not want to be remembered in the way the treatment desires them to be, but endeavour to reproduce themselves in accordance with the timelessness of the unconscious and its capacity for hallucination!

Freud, S., "The dynamics of transference" (1912), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1958, p. 108.

By means of analysis, as you know, starting from the symptom, we arrive at a knowledge of the infantile experiences to which the libido is fixated and out of which the symptoms are made. Well, the surprise lies in the fact that these scenes from infancy are not always true. Indeed, they are not true in the majority of cases and in a few of them they are the direct opposite of the historical truth. As you will see, this discovery is calculated more than any other to discredit either analysis, which has led to this result, or the patients, on whose statements the analysis and our whole understanding of the neuroses are founded.

Freud, S., "The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms" (1916-1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 367.

But neither of these things is the case: the position can be shown to be that the childhood experiences constructed or remembered in analysis are sometimes indisputably false and sometimes equally certainly correct, and in most cases compounded of truth and falsehood. Sometimes, then, symptoms represent events which really took place and to which we may attribute an influence on the fixation of the libido, and sometimes they represent phantasies of the patient's which are not, of course, suited to playing an aetiological role.

Freud, S., “The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms” (1916-1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 367.

It seems to me quite possible that all the things that are told to us to-day in analysis as phantasy - the seduction of children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental intercourse, the threat of castration (or rather castration itself) - were once real occurrences in the primaeval times of the human family, and that children in their phantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth.

Freud, S., “The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms” (1916-1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVI*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 371.

Scenes, like this one in my present patient’s case, which date from such an early period and exhibit a similar content, and which further lay claim to such an extraordinary significance for the history of the case, are as a rule not reproduced as recollections, but have to be divined – constructed – gradually and laboriously from an aggregate of indications.

Freud, S., “From the History of An Infantile Neurosis (Wolfman)” (1919), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 51.

All that we find in the prehistory of neuroses is that the child catches hold of this phylogenetic experience where his own experience fails him. He fills in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth; he replaces occurrences in his own life by occurrences in the life of his ancestors.

Freud, S., “From the History of An Infantile Neurosis (Wolfman)” (1919), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 97.

I do not know whether this is true historically, but an element of psychological truth lies behind the rumour. In all of us, throughout life, the libido normally oscillates between male and female objects; [...] Naturally, when the swing-over is fundamental and final, we suspect the presence of some special factor which definitely favours one side or the other, and which perhaps has only waited for the appropriate moment in order to turn the choice of object in its direction.

Freud, S., “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, pp. 157-158.

The patient cannot remember the whole of what is repressed in him, and what he cannot remember may be precisely the essential part of it. Thus, he acquires no sense of conviction of the correctness of the construction that has been communicated to him. He is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, remembering it as something belonging to the past.

Freud, S., “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 18.

It has not been possible to demonstrate in other connections that the human intellect has a particularly fine flair for the truth or that the human mind shows any special inclination for recognizing the truth. We have rather found, on the contrary, that our intellect very easily goes astray without any warning, and that nothing is more easily believed by us than what, without reference to the truth, comes to meet our wishful illusions. [...] We too believe that the pious solution contains the truth - but the *historical* truth and not the *material* truth.

Freud, S., "Moses and Monotheism" (1939), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p.129.

One of these effects would be the emergence of the idea of a single great god [...] it *must* be believed. To the extent to which it is distorted, it may be described as a *delusion*; in so far as it brings a return of the past, it must be called the *truth*. Psychiatric delusions, too, contain a small fragment of truth and the patient's conviction extends over from this truth on to its delusional wrappings.

Freud, S., "Moses and Monotheism" (1939), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 129-130.

JACQUES LACAN

Écrits:

Certainly, there is no question of restoring the chain of those reactions through the narrative, but the very moment in which the account is given can constitute a significant fragment of the chain, on condition that we demand that the patient provide the entire text and that we free him from the chains of the narrative.

Lacan, J., "Beyond the Reality Principle," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 65.

Whereas Freud assumed responsibility for showing us that there are illnesses that speak [...] and for making us hear the truth of what they say, it seems that this truth inspires more fear in the practitioners who perpetuate this technique as its relation to a historical moment and an institutional crisis becomes clearer.

Lacan, J., "Presentation on Transference," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 177.

What is involved is a scansion of structures in which truth is transmuted for the subject, structures that affect not only her [Dora's] comprehension of things, but her very position as a subject, her "objects" being a function of that position. This means that the conception of the case history is *identical* to the progress of the subject, that is, to the reality of the treatment.

Lacan, J., "Presentation on Transference," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 178.

For to say of psychoanalysis and of history that, qua sciences, they are both sciences of the particular, does not mean that the facts they deal with are purely accidental or even factitious, or that their ultimate value comes down to the brute aspect of trauma. Events are engendered in a primal historicization — in other words, history is already being made on the stage where it will be played out once it has been written down, both in one's heart of hearts and outside.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 216.

The subject goes far beyond what is experienced "subjectively" by the individual; he goes exactly as far as the truth he is able to attain [...]. Yes, this truth of his history is not all contained in his script, and yet the place is marked there in the painful conflicts he experiences because he knows only his own lines, and even in the pages whose disarray gives him little comfort.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 219.

It is the truth of what this desire has been in his history that the subject cries out through his symptom [...].

Lacan, J., "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 431.

It is the power to do good – no power has any other end – and that is why power has no end. But something else is at stake here: truth, the only truth, the truth about the effects of truth. Once Oedipus set off down this path, he had already given up power.

Lacan, J., "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 535.

Seminars:

This is so clearly Freud's doctrine that there is no other meaning to give to his term *overdetermination*, or to his necessary requirement that for a symptom to occur there must be at least a duality, at least two conflicts at work, one current and one old.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses.*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 119.

[A]nalysis is absolutely inseparable from a fundamental question about the way truth enters into the life of man. The dimension of truth is mysterious, inexplicable, nothing decisively enables the necessity of it to be grasped, since man accommodates himself to non-truth perfectly well.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses.*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 214.

This brings us back to that at once mythical and idealizing pole that Szasz *calls the integrity of the analyst*. What can this mean, if it is not a recall to the dimension of truth?

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 137.

Everything that can be said about myth is this, that the truth reveals itself in an alternation of strictly opposite things, which have to be made to revolve around one another. This holds for whatever has been constructed ever since the world has been the world, including the higher, very elaborate, myths like Yin and Yang.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 174

[E]verything, that pertains to the effect of language, everything that instates the "demansion" of truth, is posited on the basis of a fictional structure.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 54.

It is because a fictional structure is promoted somewhere, which is the very essence of language, that something can be produced: a sort of questioning, pushing, or squeezing that forces truth into a corner, so to speak, requiring it to undergo verification. This is nothing but the dimension of science.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 115.

No fiction could prove satisfying, if not one among them that had to abandon all recourse to intuition in order to confine itself to something inscribable. This is why we have to hold to the inscribable in its relationship to verification.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 115.

What creates light begins from the field that is itself defined as being that of truth. Now, even if it were to have an efficient effect on what constitutes opacity, the actual light that this field gives off at every moment casts a shadow, and it is the shadow that has an impact. This is why we always have to investigate truth itself regarding its fictional structure.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, pp. 115-116.

Truth is the “dit-mension”, the “mension” of what is said (*la mension du dit*). In this vein, you can’t say it any better than the Gospels. You can’t speak any better of the truth. That is why they are the Gospels. You can’t even bring the dimension of truth into play any better, in other words, push away reality in fantasy (*mieux repousser la réalité dans le fantasme*).

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 107.

Elsewhere:

Even if the memories of familial suppression weren’t true, they would have to be invented and that is certainly done. That’s what myth is, the attempt to give an epic form to what is operative through the structure. The sexual impasse exudes the fictions that rationalize the impossible within which it originates. I don’t say they are imagined; like Freud, I read in them the invitation to the real that underwrites them.

Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 30.

It's a defensible proposition to say that truth has the structure of fiction. This is what is normally called “myth” - many truths have a mythical existence - it is precisely for this reason that truth cannot be exhausted, that the whole truth cannot be said. This is what I stated in the following form - truth can only be half said. One speaks the truth as best one can, that is, in part. It is just that in the way it presents itself, it presents itself as a whole. And that's precisely where the difficulty lies - it's that you have to make the one who is in analysis sense that this truth is not whole, that it's not true for everyone, that it isn't - this is an old idea - that it isn't general, that it's not valid for everyone.

Lacan, J., "Columbia University Lecture on the Symptom," *The Lacanian Review* 12, 2022, pp. 76-77.

We never wake up: desire sustains dreams. Death is a dream, among other dreams that perpetuate life, that of dwelling in the mythical. Death is situated on the side of awakening.

Lacan, J., "Improvisation: Desire of Death, Dream and Awakening," *The Lacanian Review* 15, 2024, p. 21.

JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER

The beginning of Lacan's teaching is marked in an essential way by this reference. To start with, he said, an analysis is above all *the* truth in progress for the subject. The singular is of paramount importance here, because *the* truth was supposed to be inscribed in the continuity of a history. This history is not the incidental little stories [*histories*] that the analysand recounts, which are here devalorized. When Lacan said "history", the history of a subject, it was on the contrary with the utmost valorization—*the* truth was tied to *this history in the singular*.

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, pp. 107-108.

But from where we are now something else appears - this correlation established between the unconscious and history, a history that is, strictly speaking, the place of truth. This definition in itself allows us to perceive that for Lacan truth was the antonym of repression.

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 108.

Hystory in place of *history* is what volatilizes the ideal notion of history with which Lacan had begun, reinscribing it within the context of a relation of the analysand to the analyst. This becomes a transferential history – *history* does not have the continuity of ideal history. Here the truth can become plural, can lose the definite article. It is merely a question of a truth that emerges, which is not necessarily coherent with another that emerges elsewhere, later on. It is not presupposed that they constitute a continuity, they are rather slivers of truth, dispersed. It is also here that Lacan, in his very last teaching, formulates *la varité*, the variable truth.

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 109.

Truth, forever unfixable, like the subject always making for the margins, truth for which there is no pedagogue. Therefore, everything that belongs to the connexions is already being progressively pushed back, driven down to the register of foundation studies. This truth likewise appears as rebellious to any connexion, a truth he describes at this time as 'foreign to reality, refractory to the choice of sex' and 'rather inhuman'. But there is at the same time an equivocation, because this unfixable truth seems to possess a content that is particularly full of pathos: the truth of castration.

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis and Connexions," *Hurly-Burly* 3, 2010, p. 217.

Fiction in analysis is a making that relies on a saying. But the fictional is opposed to the real and, since long ago I took as a slogan *the orientation towards the real*, which involves drawing out all the consequences of the fictional structure of truth.

Miller J.-A., "Psychoanalysis Has a Structure of Fiction," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 143.

The structure of language is ultimately nothing but an elucubration of knowledge about *lalangue*. In other words, the structure of language is nothing but a fiction, it has a structure of fiction – *lucubration* means this if one radicalizes it.

Miller, J.-A., “Psychoanalysis Has a Structure of Fiction,” *The Lacanian Review* 7, p. 144.

Lacan will be very gentle when he says ‘truth has the structure of fiction,’ because in the end, in a certain sense, Freud is saying that ‘truth has the structure of delusion,’ that there is at least a close affinity between truth and delusion, that truth manifests itself in the form of delusion.

Miller, J.-A., “Marginalia to ‘Constructions in Analysis’,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 22, 2011, p. 54.

What is historical truth? It’s not the exactitude of what took place, it’s the reorganisation of what took place through the perspective of what will be.

Miller, J.-A., “Marginalia to ‘Constructions in Analysis’,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 22, 2011, p. 58.

The truth and the whole truth are not the same thing. How could you make a whole, how could you make a totality of a vagabond truth, of a truth that wanders, that doesn’t allow itself to be shut up in such a prison? Freudian truth is not totality. [...] Truth shuns as much the Whole as the One. There is not One. [...] That is why the truth is always Other.

Miller J.-A., “Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 15.

What is important is that in this very narration, holes manifest themselves, stumbling blocks that are so many signs of another truth, of another meaning, which struggle to be conjugated in the fiction of a narration. This is why these elements that emerge and disrupt the narrative cycle are given the value of the real rather than the value of truth and of meaning.

Miller, J.-A., “Truth is Coupled with Meaning,” *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, pp. 14-15.

Truth is coupled with meaning, and the two of them make a trio with fiction.

Miller, J.-A., “Truth is Coupled with Meaning,” *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 15.

[*Jouis-sens*, enjoy-meant is a new version of the function of fantasy: it is an amboceptor. It is an amboceptor between truth and jouissance, between language and jouissance, something that connects the two sides.

Miller, J.-A., “Truth is Coupled with Meaning,” *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, pp. 16-17.

It was in object *a* that he concentrated the paradox of the amboception of truth and jouissance.

Miller, J.-A., “Truth is Coupled with Meaning,” *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 17.

What relationship to the real does this definition of the *unconscious as history* entail? [...] In analytic experience there is indeed the dimension of recounting the episodes of one’s life, picking certain episodes out as constituting a turning point and grasping others as opaque [...] Let’s say that this first approach to the unconscious supposes, in its different formulations, supremacy of the true over the real.

Miller, J.-A., “The Space of a Hallucination,” *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 87.

‘Immemorial forms’ means that we are not in the register of memory, but, on the contrary, in something that is already there all alone. [...] the subject being unable at that time to form a truth on the basis of his experience.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Hallucination," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 103.

Why this term 'reminiscence' with its Platonic echo? Plato situates reminiscence as a relationship with what is eternal and outside time. [...] It's as if the extratemporal itself is being laid bare, which is neither a truth nor a lie, but a real, pure and simple.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Hallucination," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 103.

The lying truth clarifies, comments on, the term "fiction." Which emphasis should be put on the adjective "lying"? In my opinion, it is not a question of opposing a lying truth and a truthful truth, but of holding as essential, constitutive, the alliance between the truth and the lie.

Miller, J.-A., "The Lying Truth," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p.149.

'Freud's romance is composed of his love affairs with truth.' The term 'romance' places the knowledge of Freud in the rank of fiction and not that of science; it is to equally say that Freud was wrong to believe the hysteric, even though this path opened the Freudian field.

Miller, J.-A., "The Pass of Psychoanalysis Toward Science: The Desire for Knowledge," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 80.

In Solomon's apologue, speech takes center stage, while Saint Martin's apologue is a speechless story. On the one hand, we have the tricks of speech, lies, and contradictions; on the other, the simplicity of doing. Solomon's word is a ruse, since he gives an order designed to be played, not obeyed. It evokes *Hamlet's* line, quoted by Freud: *with the bait of lies, I caught the carp of truth*.

Miller, J.-A., "The Love of One's Neighbor: Saint Martin and Solomon," *The Lacanian Review* 15, 2024, p. 35.

As Lacan puts it, utilitarianism in part subverts traditional morality, insofar as it makes ideals appear as semblances or fictions and locates as the only real the pleasure they give.

Miller, J.-A., "The Love of One's Neighbor: Saint Martin and Solomon," *The Lacanian Review* 15, 2024, p. 35.

Operating by means of the effects of truth does not entail believing in it, but on the contrary should liberate one from it. Belief in the true is shared by psychoanalysis and religion, notably by the religion that calls itself the true religion. The movement that obsessed Lacan – and to which, he said, he did not have all the keys – was, in some way, to force psychoanalysis outside of itself by obliging it to consider the way it operates from another perspective than that of truth. That perspective is the perspective of the real.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Lapsus," *The Lacanian Review* 6, pp. 69-71.

ÉRIC LAURENT

[A]nd why we have to conceive of the symptom not on the basis of belief in the Name-of-the-Father, but on the basis of the efficacy of psychoanalytic practice. Through its handling of truth, this practice obtains something that touches on the real. Something resonates in the body from the angle of the symbolic, and this compels the symptom to respond. Our question shall be: 'how do our bodies speak beyond the hysterical symptom that presupposes love for the father as its horizon?'

Laurent, É., "Speaking Through One's Symptom, Speaking Through One's Body," *Hurly Burly* 11, 2014, p. 139.

The structure of the three condemned people and one lacking disk is exactly the Oedipal structure of the father, mother, and child, trapped in their private hell. They can only calculate because one element is missing: the phallus. No one has it, but the three of them have to take that symbol into account to define their position as father, mother, and child. If anyone of them makes an error, thinking that he or she is the one that is missing – if the father thinks he is *the* father, if the mother thinks she is *Woman*, if the child thinks it is the phallus for its mother – then they all get stuck in their calculation. No one will find a way out. They will be stuck in eternal repetition.

Laurent, É., “Alienation and Separation (I),” *Reading Seminar XI: Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, eds. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 23.

But if they [father, mother, and child] admit that that element is fundamentally missing [the phallus] – that everyone has to define his or her position with respect to that symbol – then they have a chance to attain what are known as truth values in analysis, that is, desire values.

Laurent, É., “Alienation and Separation (I),” *Reading Seminar XI: Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, eds. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 23.

Truth is approached above all in its dream dimension: “The truth of which the so-called unconscious function dreams.”

Laurent, É., “The Case from Unease to the Lie,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 21*, 2011, pp. 88-89.

At the end of the love affair with truth, one has, as an axiom, something which is written about which there is not very much to say.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: from Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, pp. 127-128.

He [Lacan] notes that one fights in the name of truth, and one could even say that one dies in the name of truth.

Laurent, É., “Symptom and Discourse,” *Jacques Lacan & the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII*, eds. J. Clemens & R. Grigg, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2006, p. 234.



Golconda, René Magritte

2 – Mistake, Lie and Evasion

SIGMUND FREUD

Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia. “Where are you going?” asked one. “To Cracow,” was the answer. “What a liar you are!” broke out the other. “If you say you’re going to Cracow, you want me to believe you’re going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you’re going to Cracow. So why are you lying to me?” [...] according to the uncontradicted assertion of the first Jew, the second is lying when he tells the truth and is telling the truth by means of a lie. [...] I think that jokes of this kind are sufficiently different from the rest to be given a special position. What they are attacking is not a person or an institution but the certainty of our knowledge itself, one of our speculative possessions.

Freud, S., “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1960, p. 115.

These lies occur under the influence of excessive feelings of love, and become momentous when they lead to a misunderstanding between the child and the person it loves.

Freud, S., “Two lies told by children” (1913), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1911-1913, p. 305.

[T]he psycho-analytic treatment is founded on truthfulness. In this fact lies a great part of its educative effect and its ethical value. It is dangerous to depart from this foundation. Anyone who has become saturated in the analytic technique will no longer be able to make use of the lies and pretences which a doctor normally finds unavoidable; and if, with the best intentions, he does attempt to do so, he is very likely to betray himself.

Freud, S., “Observations on Transference-Love” (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 164.

Reaction-formations against certain instincts take the deceptive form of a change in their content, as though egoism had changed into altruism, or cruelty into pity.

Freud, S., “Thoughts for the Times of War and Death” (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 281.

It is interesting to find that the pre-existence of strong “bad” impulses in infancy is often the actual condition for an unmistakable inclination towards “good” in the adult.

Freud, S., “Thoughts for the Times of War and Death” (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 282.

I told her one day that I did not believe these dreams, that I regarded them as false or hypocritical, and that she intended to deceive me just as she habitually deceived her father. [...] after I had made this clear, this kind of dream ceased. But I still believe that [...] the dreams partly expressed the wish to win my favour; they were also an attempt to gain my interest and my good opinion—perhaps in order to disappoint me all the more thoroughly later on.

Freud, S., “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 165.

[T]he recognition of these lying dreams does not constitute any shattering novelty. I know, indeed, that the craving of mankind for mysticism is ineradicable, and that it makes ceaseless efforts to win back for mysticism the territory it has been deprived of by *The Interpretation of Dreams* [...] A dream is not the ‘unconscious’ [...]

Freud, S., “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, pp. 165-166.

[H]uman beings can go through such great and important moments of their erotic life without noticing them much, [...] deceive themselves so thoroughly in their judgement of them. This [...] seems also to be common enough in ordinary life.

Freud, S., “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 166.

In our interpretation, we take the liberty of disregarding the negation and of picking out the subject-matter alone of the association. It is as though the patient had said: ‘It’s true that my mother came into my mind as I thought of this person, but I don’t feel inclined to let the association count.’

Freud, S., “Negation” (1925), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 234

To negate something in a judgement is, at bottom, to say: 'This is something which I should prefer to repress'. A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression; its 'no is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin – like, let us say, 'Made in Germany'.

Freud, S., "Negation" (1925), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 236.

Symptom-formation, then, does in fact put an end to the danger-situation. It has two aspects: one, hidden from view, brings about the alteration in the id in virtue of which the ego is removed from danger; the other, presented openly, shows what has been created in place of the instinctual process that has been affected – namely, the substitutive formation.

Freud, S., "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 145.

A Weltanschauung erected upon science has, apart from its emphasis on the real external world, mainly negative traits, such as submission to the truth and rejection of illusions. Any of our fellow-men who is dissatisfied with this state of things, who calls for more than this for his momentary consolation, may look for it where he can find it.

Freud, S., "Lecture XXXV: The Question of a Weltanschauung (New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis)" (1933), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 182.

JACQUES LACAN

Écrits:

And language, being approached via its function of social expression, reveals both its significant unity in intention and its constitutive ambiguity as subjective expression, admitting something that contradicts thought or using thought to lie.

Lacan, J., "Beyond the Reality Principle," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 67.

The reason for the ambiguity of hysterical revelation of the past is not so much the vacillation of its content between the imaginary and reality [réel], for it is situated in both. Nor is it the fact that it is made up of lies. It is that it presents us with the birth of truth in speech, and thereby brings us up against the reality of what is neither true nor false.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 212.

The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be refound; most often it has already been written elsewhere [...].

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 215.

The contents of the unconscious, in their deceptive ambiguity, supply us no reality in the subject more consistent than the immediate; it is from truth that they derive their virtue in the dimension of being: *Kern unseres Wesens* is Freud's own expression.

Lacan, J., "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 431.

In other words, this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which my lie subsists. Here we see that the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language.

Lacan, J., "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 436.

But it is clear that Speech begins only with the passage from the feint to the order of the signifier, and that the signifier requires another locus – the locus of the Other, the Other as witness, the witness who is Other than any of the partners – for the Speech borne by the signifier to be able to lie, that is, to posit itself as Truth.

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 683.

It should be noted that a clue may be found in the clear alienation that leaves it up to the subject to butt up against the question of his essence, in that he may not misrecognize that what he desires presents itself to him as what he does not want – a form assumed by negation in which misrecognition is inserted in a very odd way, the misrecognition, of which he himself is unaware, by which he transfers the permanence of his desire to an ego that is nevertheless obviously intermittent, and, inversely, protects himself from his desire by attributing to it these very intermittences.

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 690-691.

Seminars:

In analysis, truth emerges in the most clearcut representative of the mistake - the slip, the action which one improperly calls *manquée* [missed, failed, abortive]. [...] These acts, these words reveal a truth from behind. Within what we call free associations, dream images, symptoms, a word bearing the truth is revealed. If Freud's discovery has any meaning, it is that – truth grabs error by the scruff of the neck in the mistake.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 265.

The moment when the subject interrupts himself is usually the most significant moment in his approach towards the truth. At this point we gain a sense of resistance in its pure state, which culminates in the feeling, often tinged with anxiety, of the analyst's presence.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 52.

[T]here is no error which does not present and promulgate itself as truth. In short, error is the habitual incarnation of the truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 263.

We must be able to formulate this answer in a way that homes in more closely on what led me to choose this abbreviation, S(A). This abbreviation does not imply that whatever happens at the level of A is of no value whatsoever – otherwise stated, that all truth is fallacious.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 298.

Remember what I had occasion to write in my report on The direction of the Treatment about Ernst Kris's observation with respect to the case of plagiarism. Being on a certain path that perhaps we shall have to name, Kris seeks to silence his patient by means of the truth. He shows him in the most irrefutable way that he is not a plagiarist, he has read his book and it is well and truly original [...]. The subject cannot dispute this. Only, he doesn't give a damn.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 124.

[T]he unconscious always merits our confidence, he says, and the discourse of the dream is something other than the unconscious, it is forged from a desire stemming from the unconscious – [...] therefore she does indeed desire something and, stemming from the unconscious, this desire is what is being expressed through these lies. She tells him as much herself, her dreams lie. Freud comes to a halt faced with the problem of any symptomatic lie – look what lies are for children – it's the problem of what the subject means when lying. And the odd thing is that Freud lets everything drop when all the parts seize up. He's not interested in what's jamming them, namely, the waste object, the little remainder, which brings everything to a stop and which nevertheless is what is in question here. [...] This is the point at which Freud refuses to see, in truth – which is his passion – the structure of fiction that stands at its origin.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p.129.

Impediment, failure, split. In a spoken or written sentence something stumbles. Freud is attracted by these phenomena, and it is there that he seeks the unconscious.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 25.

In the first instance, it [the double-sided] is as establishing itself in, and even by, a certain lie, that we see set up the dimension of truth, in which respect it is not, strictly speaking, shaken, since the lie as such is itself posited in this dimension of truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 138.

In the way of deception in which the subject is venturing, the analyst is in a position to formulate this *you are telling the truth*, and my interpretation has meaning only in this dimension.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 140.

Precisely, the truth flies off. The truth flies off the very moment you no longer wanted to grab it.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 57.

Truth does in effect seem to be foreign to us, I mean our own truth. It is no doubt with us, but without concerning us to the point that one really wants to speak it.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 58.

The locus of the Other, as I have always said, is made for truth to be inscribed there, that is everything of that order, the false, even lies – which only exist on the foundation of truth. This is in the free play speech [parole] and language.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 187.

[M]an is never anything but a little boy. The fact that the hysteric can't let go of that casts doubt on the function of the last word of her truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 138.

[N]one of the supposed paradoxes that classical logic gets bent out of shape about, for example, that of "I am lying," hold up unless they are written. It is absolutely clear that to say "I am lying" is something that poses no obstacle, given that people lie all the time [...] it is only when it is written that there is a paradox, because then a question arises: "Are you lying now or are you telling the truth?"

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 58.

It is perfectly acceptable to the unconscious to always speak the truth and to lie. It's up to you to know that. What does that teach you? That you only know something about truth when it is unleashed.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 59.

Truth involves getting off on making believe [*faire semblant*], and never admitting that the reality of each of these two halves [jouissance and semblance] predominates solely by asserting that it depends on the other half – that is, by lying with the one half, and then with the other [*mentir à jets alternés*]. Such is the half-speaking of the truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 131.

Elsewhere:

No doubt this is sufficient, not that speech isn't the natural vehicle of error, the chosen vehicle of mendacity, and the normal vehicle of misunderstanding, but because speech is deployed in the dimension of truth, and so gives rise to it, albeit to the subject's horror.

Lacan, J., "True Psychoanalysis, and False," *Hurly-Burly 11*, 2014, p. 23.

The signifying inventory of *lalangue* supplies only the cipher of meaning. According to context, each word takes on an enormous and disparate range of meaning [...]. This is no less true for whole parts of organized sentences [...]. No matter their grammar is buttressed by writing, and it bears witness, for all that, to a real, to a real which remains, as we know, an enigma as long as in analysis the pseudo-sexual spring doesn't pop out: that real which, capable only of lying to the partner, is marked as neurosis, perversion, or psychosis.

Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 10.

Which leads her into the familiar masquerade that is not just the lie that some ingrates, themselves clinging to the role of *Man* (L'homme), accuse her. Rather, she prepares herself on-the-off-chance, so that her inner fantasy of *Man* will find its hour of truth. That's not excessive, since truth is already woman insofar as it's not-all, unable, in any case, to be wholly spoken.

Lacan, J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, pp. 40-41.

Communication of what, for God's sake? Of truth? All the same, it's very curious that everyone fails to notice that words serve equally well for telling the truth or lying. And that there's every chance that they are used to lie more often than to tell the truth, a well-known fact, highlighted long ago by the famous liar paradox, which has nothing paradoxical about it.

Lacan, J., "The Lacanian Phenomenon," *The Lacanian Review* 9, 2020, p. 25.

It would still be the case that I am speaking the truth. This is not so: I have failed. There is no truth that, in passing through attention, does not lie.

Lacan, J., "Preface to the English Edition of *Seminar XI*," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 23.

JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER

At the very beginning of Lacan's teaching, the configuration of truth in its relation to the lie is the opposite of that expressed in his final *écrit* where we find the expression that I have highlighted: 'the lying truth.' Similarly, the new Lacanian regime of truth is marked in an explicit way in his final *écrit* by a reference to history where this key term is modified by the introduction of a neologism: *history* [*histoire*] becomes *history* [*hystoire*] with a 'y.'

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, pp. 108-109.

Lacan distinguished two modes of repression: the blank and the lie – silence or *not telling the truth* – camouflaging something and then putting the story back together with the help of artifice. In thinking about this use of the word 'truth,' what becomes clear is that it is completely external to the lie. It is either the truth or the lie. Lying is one of the names for repression, while the truth sanctions the lifting of a repression.

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 108.

This thing that has been said may have had an oracular value for him, whether he has worked throughout his life to verify it, to render it true, or whether he hastened to deny it

Miller J.-A., *Analysis Laid Bare*, trans. A. Duncan, New York: Lacanian Press, 2023, p. 32.

It is especially on the side of the cognitive-behaviorist therapies that we find a refusal, a refutation of the symptom, while in psychoanalysis, the symptom had a value of truth, it represented the truth, always presented it behind a mask, and so as a lie, and it was necessary to take the time to verify the symptom, 'verify' in the sense of rendering it true.

Miller, J.-A., "A Fantasy," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 34, 2019, p. 165.

A psychoanalyst is not required to love the effects of truth from the unconscious. And that is difficult, because an analyst is also an analysand or a former analysand. And yet, in the name of what Lacanian practice could be, we must not love the true any more than the beautiful or the good.

Miller, J.-A., "A Fantasy," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 34, 2019, p. 173.

First and foremost, truth breaks free from any chain or leash. It throws you in panic and has to be silenced. Only then does one discover that, in unleashing you against it, you had been held on a leash by truth.

Miller, J.-A., "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 41.

[t]he speech that is authorised and called for by the analytical discourse is what Lacan calls "the lying truth," *the truth* (and this is my own way of putting it) *that lies about jouissance*. One cannot say the truth about jouissance. If one cannot say the whole truth, this is because there is a zone, a field, a register of existence, where truth does not apply, and this register is jouissance, i.e. that which gives satisfaction.

Miller, J.-A., "Truth is Coupled with Meaning," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 9.

In place of repression, the analysis of the *parlêtre* installs mendacious truth, which stems from what Freud recognised as primary repression. This means that truth is intrinsically of the same essence as the lie. [...] what doesn't lie is jouissance, the jouissance of the speaking body.

Miller, J.-A., "The Unconscious and the Speaking Body," *Scilicet - The Speaking Body*, 2015, p. 42.

An interpretation is not a fragment of construction bearing on an isolated element of repression, as Freud thought it was. It is not the flight of fancy of a knowledge. Nor is it a truth-effect that is immediately absorbed back into the succession of lies. An interpretation is an act of saying that targets the speaking body and does so in order to produce an event, in order to provoke a gut-reaction, said Lacan.

Miller, J.-A., "The Unconscious and the Speaking Body," *Scilicet - The Speaking Body*, 2015, p. 42.

The lying truth, as I understand it, says something else that is more radical: the truth is itself a lie. This is not a small thing when it comes from Lacan, who made truth the pivot, the mainspring, of the analytic experience.

Miller, J.-A., "The Lying Truth," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 149.

There, in this transmutation of contingency into necessity, the lying truth insinuates itself. It is what has always been qualified in psychoanalysis as "rationalization." Lacan, for his part, did not use this term, but what one calls rationalization is to superimpose on the absurd a rational lie, a lie that makes sense.

Miller, J.-A., "The Lying Truth," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 152.

The truth operation that is accomplished in analysis, which makes the truth surge from the factual contingency, the truth operation that gives meaning and reason to the case, to what happens, to what falls into your life, to what you stumble over, this truth operation is a lying operation.

Miller, J.-A., "The Lying Truth," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 152.

Of course, the very articulation of the analytic discourse leads the analysand to construct, to weave a grid of a lying truth, of a variable truth, of a truth that incessantly tips over into a lie, of a purely transitory truth, a grid that he weaves from past contingencies and daily contingencies.

Miller, J.-A., "The Lying Truth," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 153.

It is what Lacan called the sexual non-rapport, that is to say the negative universal, unwritten, applicable to the human species. This expression translates, ultimately, the fact that differing from the other animal species, the mode of sexual rapport between members of the human species is especially open to variation, to truth and to lying, to contingency and invention.

Miller, J.-A., "The Signature of the Symptoms," *The Lacanian Review* 11, 2021, p. 41.

Therefore, does the analyst really have to do with the lie in analysis? One mustn't allow oneself to be taken in by the significations put forward by the dream, by the unconscious, but the attitude of wariness, the 'non-dupe' attitude, doesn't suit the analyst either. It is rather a matter of always trusting the kernel of truth that is there, in the lie too, the delusion, and the hallucination. Freud's text ends on the kernel of truth, *Wahrheitskern*. A person's lies reveal this kernel of truth more than all the rest.

Miller, J.-A., "Marginalia to 'Constructions in Analysis'," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 22, 2011, p. 66.

The Pass bis can only be called a test of truth *cum grano salis*. The test of truth is analysis, where one tries to say what's true. [...] If the Pass bis is a test of truth, the difference is that having reached the real unconscious one is supposed to know that truth is a mirage, and that from truth, 'only lies can be expected.'

Miller J.-A., "Pass Bis," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 17, 2008, p. 100.

In psychoanalysis, bungled actions and successful ones, as you know, are failures as far as meaning is concerned, that is, in terms of their signifying intention. Yet those actions are successful as far as the truth arising from misunderstanding is concerned.

Miller J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 19.

The unconscious of deceitful truth is, as Lacan said in the Seminar *Encore*, a lucubration of knowledge about language insofar as *lalangue* is the symbolic chain whose three dimensions are reduced to the real, that is, to the noise of *lalangue*, in which one hears everything and anything.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Hallucination," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 107.

Freud comes to formulate that this is the real of the unconscious, but that it includes something that is not true – Lacan takes this up by speaking of a real that can only lie. [...] Freud gives birth to a new real, the fantastic real.

Miller J.-A., "Unconscious Knowledge and the Unconscious Subject," *The Lacanian Review* 17, 2025, pp. 27-28.

ÉRIC LAURENT

As Lacan says, the analyst is a poem rather than a poet when he accedes to this dimension in language. It is the point at which the *orthè doxa* – which leans on the structure in the real – bears witness to the ‘lie’ of the real.

Laurent, É. “The Case from Unease to the Lie,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 21*, 2011, p. 88.

If the symbolic in the real has the lie as its name, the encounter has the form of an outside-sense, from where the lie is a sign for a subject, through an effect that attains the efficacy of a witticism.

Laurent, É. “The Case from Unease to the Lie,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 21*, 2011, p. 93.

Should analysands try to name all the truths about their love life they encounter in analysis, these truths just disappear, fade away. But at least they know what they are. They are behind them and will always follow them as a consistency. [...] that’s one of the possible readings of the fact that the object at the end is behind and pushes.

Laurent, É., “The Oedipus Complex,” *Reading Seminars I and II*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 74.



The Great War, René Magritte

3 – Fake and Transparency

SIGMUND FREUD

I am thinking of irony [...] Its essence lies in saying the opposite of what one intends to convey to the other person, but in sparing him contradiction by making him understand – by one's tone of voice, by some accompanying gesture, or (where writing is concerned) by some small stylistic indications – that one means the opposite of what one says.

Freud, S., "Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious" (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1960, p. 174.

In jest – it is well known - one may even tell the truth.

Freud, S., "Thoughts for the Times of War and Death" (1915), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 298.

[S]cience has so little to tell us about the origin of sexuality that we can liken the problem to a darkness into which not so much as a ray of a hypothesis has penetrated.

Freud, S., "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 57.

And finally we must not forget that the analytic relationship is based on a love of truth – that is, on a recognition of reality – and that it precludes any kind of sham or deceit.

Freud, S., “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1964, p. 248.

JACQUES LACAN

Écrits:

I am not playing at being paradoxical by claiming that science need know nothing about truth. But I am not forgetting that truth is a value that (cor)responds to the uncertainty with which man’s lived experience is phenomenologically marked or that the search for truth historically motivates, under the heading of the spiritual, the mystic’s flights and the moralist’s rules, the ascetic’s progress and the mystagogue’s finds alike.

Lacan, J., “Beyond the Reality Principle,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 63.

But truth in its specific value remains foreign to the order of science: science can be proud of its alliances with truth; it can adopt the phenomenon and value of truth as its object; but it cannot in any way identify truth as its own end.

Lacan, J., “Beyond the Reality Principle,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 63.

What then does it mean to interpret transference? Nothing but to fill the emptiness of this standstill with a lure. But even though it is deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting the whole process in motion anew.

Lacan, J., “Presentation on Transference,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 184.

As a method based on truth and demystification of subjective camouflage, does psychoanalysis display an incommensurate ambition to apply its principles to its own corporation – that is, to psychoanalysts’ conception of their role in relation to the patient, their place in intellectual society, their relations with their peers, and their educational mission?

Lacan, J., “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 200.

[T]he witticism, indeed, in which language’s creative activity unveils its absolute gratuitousness, in which its domination of reality [reel] is expressed in the challenge of nonmeaning, and in which the humor, in the malicious grace of the free spirit [esprit libre], symbolizes a truth that does not say its last word.

Lacan, J., “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 223.

I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking. [...] This two-sided mystery can be seen to intersect the fact that truth is evoked only in that dimension of ruse whereby all “realism” in creation derives its virtue from metonymy, as well as this other fact that access to meaning is granted only to the double elbows of metaphor, when we hold in our hand their one and only key [...]

Lacan, J., “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 430.

Our science's prodigious fecundity must be examined in relation to the fact, sustaining science, that science does-not-want-to-know-anything about the truth as cause. You may recognize therein my formulation of *Verwerfung* or “foreclosure.”

Lacan, J., “Science and Truth,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 742.

It is not the sole goal of this exploration to afford you an elegant take on frameworks that, in and of themselves, fall outside of our jurisdiction: magic, religion, and even science itself. My primary concern is to remind you that, as subjects of psychoanalytic science, you must resist the temptation of each of these relations to truth as cause.

Lacan, J., “Science and Truth,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 744.

Seminars:

Now, the problem is that I have absolutely no guarantee that this Other, owing to what he has in his system, can give me back, if I may express myself thus, what I gave him – namely, his being and his essence as truth. As I told you, there is no Other of the Other. There is no signifier in the Other that can, in this case, answer for [*repondre de*] what I am. And to state things differently, the hopeless truth I mentioned earlier, the one we encounter at the level of the unconscious, is a faceless, closed truth, a truth that can be bent in any direction one likes. As we know only too well, it is truth without truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 298.

Truth has more than one face. But that's the point, what could be the first line of conduct to maintain as far as analysis is concerned is to be a little suspicious of it, and not to become all of a sudden mad about a truth, about the first pretty face encountered at the first turn in the road.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 172.

Supplying them (speaking beings) with (back)bone, writing emphasizes what was certainly accessible, albeit masked: the relationship between the sexes is not found in the field of truth, because the discourse that establishes it is based on semblance alone – paving the way solely to jouissances that parody (that's the word for it!) the truth [*celle*] that is effective there, but that remains foreign to us.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 129.

Even in our times, a witness is asked to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, and, what's more, the whole truth, if he can – but how, alas, could he? We demand of him the whole truth about what he knows. But in fact, what is sought – especially in legal testimony – is that on the basis of which one can judge his *jouissance*. The goal is that *jouissance* be avowed, precisely insofar as it may be unallowable. The truth sought is the one that is unallowable with respect to the law that regulates *jouissance*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. Bruce Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 92.

Elsewhere:

As the effect of suggestion that arises from the unconscious disperses its mirages, desire is necessarily articulated as signifying in the existential question that provides a horizon for transference.

Lacan, J., “True Psychoanalysis, and False,” *Hurly-Burly 11*, 2014, p. 21.

[O]ne of my students – I'm sorry to have to devalue his effort, [...] – thought he should say that the meaning of my teaching was that the true hold [*prise*] of the truth is that one can never grab hold of it.

What an incredible misunderstanding! At best, what childish impatience!

Lacan, J., *On the Names-of-the-Father*, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 89.

JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER

Let's take this occasion simply to note the eternal effort to subtract truth from time in order to project truth in atemporality, in order to make of what is true an immutable element unaffected by time, as if the splendor of truth demanded its withdrawal from time.

Miller, J.-A., “Introduction to the Erotics of Time,” *Lacanian Ink 24/25*, 2005, pp. 14-15.

In the regime of the discourse of the master, on the other hand, the sexual rapport was a truth repressed by the master-signifier. But we are well obliged to take note that today the master-signifier, master-signifiers no longer manage to give any existence to the sexual rapport.

Miller, J.-A., “A Fantasy” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 34*, 2019, p. 156.

This is truth in so far as it is closely connected with enigma, which is what he calls truth, strictly speaking. This is not the truth of logic [...] It is a truth that gleams in the shadows, that withers away when it exposes itself. If it stays out in the sun too long, it cancerates – Which apparently happens to everyone.

Miller, J.-A., “The Logical and the Oracular,” *The Lacanian Review 1*, 2016, p. 41.

In a certain way, when the real emerges under the guise of anxiety, it does not deceive, we are not in the order of the semblant [...] What is at stake is a real that cannot be demonstrated, but which is experienced as what does not deceive. Paradoxically, this is how it evades truth, precisely because it does not deceive.

Miller, J.-A., “Truth is Coupled with Meaning,” *The Lacanian Review 2*, 2016, p. 20.

Through doubt, Descartes nullifies, with great simplicity, entire libraries, just as he nullifies the external world – we can gauge, in this way, the ferocity of this logical requirement of certainty. *Why can I sometimes think that I see things that do not exist? Given that there are semblants, nothing that I've perceived is quite certain. Then there are dreams. But surely I am not mad.* Miller, J.-A., “Desire for Certainty: Desire and the Order of Reasons,” *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 108.

To a certain extent, it is only from the semblant that the semblant can be denounced. It is still with the help of a semblant, which is supposed to be closer to the real, that one can put in question all semblants. The *ensemblant* [the-ensemble-of-semblants], the ensemblant minus one, such is the material with which master-signifiers are made, that which occupies the place of the master signifier, even under the name *my ass*.

Miller, J.-A., “Of Women and Semblants,” *The Lacanian Review* 13, 2022, p. 61.

ÉRIC LAURENT

This "shaming" comes on the heels of Lacan's reflection on the main spring of the psychoanalyst's action, as seen by Freud. For Freud, it is a question above all of an action that is founded on the "love of truth."

Laurent, É., “Symptom and Discourse,” *Jacques Lacan & the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII*, eds. J. Clemens & R. Grigg, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006, p. 230.

Forgiveness, like absolute knowledge, delivers us from the question of truth.

Laurent, É., “Symptom and Discourse,” *Jacques Lacan & the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII*, eds. J. Clemens & R. Grigg, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2006, pp. 232-233.

The fundamental polarity is no longer between meaning and truth as a hole, but between the two sides of jouissance: that which is an empty place in discourse and makes a hole in it, but which imposes itself in its fullness of opacity.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: from Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 121.

Lacan stresses that truth, in this experiment [the three prisoners in the text *Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty*], while attained independently by each individual, has the structure of a collective calculus: it can only be attained through the others.

Laurent, É., “Alienation and Separation (I),” *Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, eds. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 23.

When he says that truth can only be attained “*par les autres*” (through the others), this is a direct response to Satre's “hell is other people.”

Laurent, É., “Alienation and Separation (I),” *Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, eds. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 23.



The Treachery of Images, René Magritte

4 – Knowledge: True and False

SIGMUND FREUD

What is recorded as a mnemonic image is not the relevant experience itself – in this respect the resistance gets its way; what is recorded is another psychical element closely associated with the objectionable one – and in this respect the *first* principle shows its strength, the principle which endeavours to fix important impressions by establishing reproducible mnemonic images.

Freud, S., “Screen Memories” (1899), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume III*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 307.

Out of a number of childhood memories of significant experiences, all of them of similar distinctness and clarity, there will be some scenes which, when they are tested (for instance by the recollection of adults), turn out to have been falsified.

Freud, S., “Screen Memories” (1899), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume III*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 322.

He also seems to us justified in certain other self-accusations; it is merely that he has a keener eye for the truth than other people who are not melancholic. [...] we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a truth of this kind.

Freud, S., “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Vintage, 2001, p. 246.

The antagonistic views which are to be found in the psycho-analytic literature of to-day are usually arrived at on the principle of pars pro toto. From a highly composite combination one part of the operative factors is singled out and proclaimed as the truth; and in its favour the other part, together with the whole combination, is then contradicted. If we look a little closer, to see which group of factors it is that has been given the preference, we shall find that it is the one that contains material already known from other sources or what can be most easily related to that material [...] What is left over, however, and rejected as false, is precisely what is new in psycho-analysis and peculiar to it.

Freud, S., "From the History of An Infantile Neurosis (Wolfman)" (1919), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 53.

It would seem that the information received by our consciousness about our erotic life is especially liable to be incomplete, full of gaps, or falsified. [...] I have not omitted to allow for the part played by subsequent forgetting.

Freud, S., "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" (1920), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1955, p. 167.

The function of judgement is concerned in the main with two sorts of decisions. It affirms or disaffirms the possession by a thing of a particular attribute; and it asserts or disputes that a presentation has an existence in reality.

Freud, S., "Negation" (1925), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 236.

The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality testing is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there.

Freud, S., "Negation" (1925), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 238.

The endeavour (of scientific thinking) is to arrive at a correspondence with reality – that is to say, with what exists outside us and independently of us and, as experience has taught us, is decisive for the fulfilment or disappointment of our wishes. This correspondence with the real external world we call 'truth.'

Freud, S., "Lecture XXXV: The Question of a Weltanschauung (New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis)" (1933), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 170.

The essence of it is that there is not only method in madness, as the poet has already perceived, but also a fragment of historical truth; and it is plausible to suppose that the compulsive belief attaching to delusions derives its strength precisely from infantile sources of this kind. [...] The vain effort would be abandoned of convincing the patient of the error of his delusion and of its contradiction of reality; and, on the contrary, the recognition of its kernel of truth would afford common ground upon which the therapeutic work could develop.

Freud, S., "Constructions in Analysis" (1937), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 267-268.

JACQUES LACAN

Écrits:

No doubt, the pathways by which truth is discovered are unsoundable, and there have even been mathematicians who have admitted to having seen the truth in dreams or having stumbled upon it by accident.

Lacan, J., "Beyond the Reality Principle," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 69.

Only the slightest disparity need appear in the logical term 'others' for it to become clear how much the truth for all depends upon the rigor of each; that truth – if reached by only some – can engender, if not confirm, error in the others; and, moreover, that if in this race to the truth one is but alone, although not all may get to the truth, still no one can get there but by means of the others.

Lacan, J., "Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 173.

For 'truth' is the name of the ideal movement that this discourse introduces into reality. In short, *psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience*, and this notion should prevail when raising the question of the nature of transference.

Lacan, J., "Presentation on Transference," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 177.

Here the distinction people make between the exact sciences and those for which there is no reason to refuse the appellation 'conjectural' no longer seems to be acceptable [...]. For exactness must be distinguished from truth, and conjecture does not exclude rigor.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, pp. 236-237.

Freud goes so far as to take liberties with the exactness of the facts when it is a question of getting at the subject's truth.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, London/New York: Norton, 2006, p. 249.

In fact, this illusion – which impels us to seek the subject's reality beyond the wall of language – is the same one that leads the subject to believe that his truth is already there in us, that we know it in advance.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 254.

Freud's discovery calls truth into question, and there is no one who is not concerned with truth.

Lacan, J., "The Freudian Thing," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 337.

A truth, if it must be said, is not easily recognized, once it has become received.

Lacan, J., "The Freudian Thing," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 340.

Nothing is to be feared more than saying something that might be true. For it would become entirely true if it were said, and Lord knows what happens when something can no longer be cast into doubt because it is true. Is that the procedure used in analysis – a progress of truth? I can already hear the philistines whispering about my intellectualistic analyses: whereas I, to the best of my knowledge, am at the very forefront in preserving what is unsayable there.

Lacan, J., “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 515.

So here we are at the palpable border between truth and knowledge; and it might be said, after all, that at first sight our science certainly seems to have readopted the solution of closing the border [...] Truth is nothing but what knowledge can learn that it knows merely by putting its ignorance to work.

Lacan, J., “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 675.

This lead did not guide me in vain, for it led me at year end to formulate our experienced division as subjects as a division between knowledge and truth, and to accompany it with a topological model, the Mobius strip; this strip conveys the fact that the division in which these two terms come together is not to be derived from a difference in origin.

Lacan, J., “Science and Truth,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 727.

[A]n inscription does not etch into the same side of the parchment when it comes from the printing-plate of truth and when it comes from that of knowledge.

Lacan, J., “Science and Truth,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 734.

A religious man leaves responsibility for the cause to God, but thereby bars his own access to truth. Thus he is led to place the cause of his desire in God's hands, and that is the true object of his sacrifice. [...] Religious people thus confer upon truth the status of guilt. The upshot being a distrust of knowledge.

Lacan, J., “Science and Truth,” *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 741.

Seminars:

[T]he fact that the subject comes out of a confused state of mind following an intervention by the analyst by no means proves that it was effective in the strictly therapeutic, structuring sense of the word, namely that it was, in the analysis, true. On the contrary.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 31.

It is impossible, in the analytic experience, to consider the subject's change of style as being the proof of the correctness of an interpretation. I consider the proof of the correctness of an interpretation to lie in the confirmatory material the subject supplies.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 31.

The question is to know whether this way of understanding the analysis of defenses doesn't land us with a technique which almost inevitably generates a specific sort of error, an error which in fact isn't one, something prior to truth and falsity. There are interpretations which are so to the point and so true [...] that one cannot say if they do or do not speak to a truth. Whichever way they will be verified.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 33.

But we can also raise the question from the opposite direction, namely, what happens when the truth of the thing is lacking, when there is nothing left to represent it in its truth, when for example the register of the father defaults.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 204.

We also find in the very text of the delusion a truth that isn't hidden, as it is in the neuroses, but made well and truly explicit and virtually theorized.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 28.

The important thing is not to understand, but to attain the true. But if you attain it by chance, even if you understand, you don't understand.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 48.

Most of the time no truth is announced, for the simple reason that most often discourse absolutely does not go via the signifying chain and is the pure and simple purring of repetition, idle chatter [...] This is everyday discourse, words put together for the purpose of saying nothing.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: The Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 11.

Once we bring signifiers into play [...] there is a remainder and the kind of subjectivity that is established is of another order, inasmuch as it refers to the locus of truth as such. Consequently, my behaviour is no longer deceptive but provocative. The A is included in it, and this means that even a lie has to appeal to truth and that the truth itself may seem not to be in the register of truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: The Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, pp. 94-95.

'Why do you tell me that you are going to Cracow when you really are going to Cracow?' This can mean that truth has need of lies. [...] The detection of bluffing and deception is also at the mercy of the Other's bad faith.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: The Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 95.

[I]t poses a kind of general law, namely, that insofar as we misrecognise the truth included in a symptom, we find ourselves complicit in symptomatic formations.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V: The Formations of the Unconscious*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 434.

Animals, I tell you, efface their traces and lay false traces. Do they for all that make signifiers? There's one thing that animals don't do – they don't lay false traces to make us believe that they are false, that is, traces that will be taken for false. Laying falsely false traces is a behaviour that is, I won't say quintessentially human, but quintessentially signifying. That's where the limit is. That's where a subject presentifies himself. When a trace has been made to be taken for a false trace, though in fact they are the traces of my true passage, we know that there's a speaking subject, we know that there's a subject as cause.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 63.

Things can branch off in every possible direction starting off from anxiety. What we were waiting for, when all's said and done, and which is the true substance of anxiety, is *that which deceives not*, that which is entirely free of doubt. Don't let yourselves be taken in by appearances. Just because anxiety's link to doubt, to hesitation, to the obsessional's so-called ambivalent game, may strike you as clinically tangible, this doesn't mean that they are the same thing. Anxiety is not doubt, anxiety is the cause of doubt.

[...] If there is one dimension wherein we have to search for the true function, the true weight, the sense behind keeping up the function of cause, then it lies in the direction of the opening that anxiety affords.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 76.

What is truth as knowledge? It can be put like this: How can we know without knowing?

It is an enigma. This is one response - it's an enigma - among other examples.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 36.

Knowledge as truth – this defines what the structure of what we call an interpretation must be.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 36.

But how, then, does Freud define the psychotic position in a letter I have quoted many times? Precisely by what he calls, strangely, *unglauben*, not wanting to know anything about the spot where truth is in question.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York-London: Norton, 1991, p. 63.

We are forever wandering about in the dimension of the love of truth, and everything indicates that this dimension makes the impossibility of that which maintains itself as real slide between our fingers, at the level, quite precisely, of the master's discourse, as Hegel has said.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 173.

Analysis enabled you to realize what the impossibility is due to, that is to say, what it is that stands in the way of grasping, of seizing the only thing that could perhaps ultimately introduce a mutation, namely, the naked real, without truth. But there is the rub. Between us and the real, there is truth. Truth [...] is the dear little sister of jouissance.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 174.

There is – and this is posited as constituting the phallus’s function – a jouissance that constitutes something in this relationship, that is different from the relationship between the sexes. What is that something? It is what I will call its “truth condition.”

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 53.

[W]hat is logic if not the absolutely fabulous paradox allowed only by writing, which is to make truth into a referent. [...] To refer to truth is to posit the absolutely false, that is, a false which one can refer as such.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 60.

There is no discourse that it is not about semblance [or: based on semblance, *Il n’est discours que de semblant*].

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 126.

To love the truth – even the truth that the hysteric incarnates, as it were – that is, to give her what you don’t have on the pretext that she desires it, is very specifically to doom yourself to theatrics [or: theater] which can no longer be anything but a charity event – that’s clear.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 134.

The distinction between truth and knowledge – i.e. between *episteme* and true *doxa* [opinion], the latter being what can ground virtue – is laid out quite explicitly in the *Meno*. What I highlighted is the exact opposite: their junction – namely, that where they seem to come together to form a circle, the knowledge at stake in the unconscious is a kind of knowledge that slides [or: slips, *glisse*], persists, and turns out at every moment to be knowledge about truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, pp. 135-136.

If what Freud said has any meaning, the dialectic of truth and semblance is situated at the level of what I designated with the term ‘sexual relationship’ [or: ‘relationship between the sexes,’ *rapport sexuel*].

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 145.

This is why the question of a discourse that might not be a semblance can be elevated to the level of an artifact of the structure [or: of the artifactual nature of the structure, *l’artefact de la structure du discours*]. There is no semblance of discourse, there is no metalanguage by which to evaluate it, there is no Other of the Other, and there is no truth about truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 6

In the scientific realm, and regardless of what people think, hypotheses have to do with logic. There is an ‘if,’ the conditional [or: protasis] of a truth that is never anything but logically articulated. And then, there is the apodosis – a consequent must be verifiable, verifiable at its level, such as it is articulated. This proves nothing about the truth of the hypothesis [...] implication in logic does not in any way imply that true conclusions can’t be drawn from false premises.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 32

They had to get to set theory in order to pose the question of a knowledge that takes truth as a mere function, which is far from contenting itself with this, and which also entails a real that has nothing to do with truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 175.

What lies behind the principle of the symptom is the inexistence of the truth that it presupposes, even though it marks out its place. There you have it for the symptom in as much as it attaches itself to truth that no longer has currency. In this respect, it can be said that like anyone who scrapes by in the modern age, not a single one of you is unacquainted with the modality of response.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 39.

If truth can only ever come midsay – this is the kernel, the essential part, of the analyst's knowledge – then, in what I have called a tetrapod or a quadruped, S_2 stands in the place of truth. This knowledge is the knowledge that is, therefore, always to be called into question. On the other hand, there is one thing that is to be claimed of analysis, which is that there is a knowledge that is drawn out of the subject himself. At the place of the pole of *jouissance*, the analytic discourse positions the barred S . This knowledge is the result of the stumbling, the bungled action, the dreams, and the work of the analysand. As far as this knowledge is concerned, it is not supposed, it is a deciduous knowledge – scrap of knowledge upon scrap of knowledge. This is what the unconscious is. I take this knowledge on board and I define it as only being able to be posited – a newly emerging term – on the basis of the subject's *jouissance*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 64.

But what, then, is the knowledge that is assured by truth? It is nothing but what stems from what is noted as a result of the fact of positing truth based on the signifier. This poise is rather tough to sustain, but is confirmed in yielding a non-initiatory knowledge, because it proceeds – no offence to anyone – from the subject who is subjected as such, by a discourse, to production. [...]

Saying *non-initiatory knowledge* is tantamount to saying *knowledge that is taught by other paths besides the direct paths of jouissance*. These paths are wholly conditioned by the founding failure of sexual *jouissance*. By that, I mean this whereby the constitutive *jouissance* of the speaking being is differentiated from sexual *jouissance*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 152.

Here, I'm going to speak only of knowledge, and I note that it's not a matter of the truth about knowledge, but of knowledge about truth. Knowledge about truth is articulated by means of the touch that I've been putting forward this year in connection with *Yad'lun*. *Yad'lun* and nothing more. It's an altogether particular One, the same that separates 1 from 2, and it's a gulf. I repeat, truth only comes midsay. When the free time is over, which will allow me to respect the alternation, I will speak about the other facet, that of the *mi-vrai*, the half-true. One ought always to *séparer le bon grain et la mivrai*, to winnow the wheat from the half-true.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 171.

As for me, I have found no better than what I have been calling *matheme* to approach something that concerns knowledge about truth, because all in all its in psychoanalysis that we have managed to give it a functional scope.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 175.

We are brothers with our patient in that, like him, we are sons of discourse. To represent this effect that I designate as the object *a* – to accustom us to this *désêtre*, this deserted Being, by dint of being the support, the refuse, the abjection, onto which can be hooked what will, thanks to us, be begotten by the fact of saying, which will of course be an Interpretant – I invite the analyst to support himself in such a way as to be worthy of transference, through this knowledge that can be questioned as such, on account of being in the place of truth. This knowledge can be questioned with respect to what has always been involved in the structure of knowledge, from *savoir-faire* through to the knowledge of science. From here, of course, we interpret but who can do so if not the very one who engages himself in the fact of saying and who, brother that we are to him, will uplift us?

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 210.

The whole truth is what cannot be told. It is what can only be told on the condition that one doesn't push it to the edge, that one only half tells (*mi-dire*) it. Yet another thing restrains (*ligote*) us regarding the status of truth: the fact that *jouissance* is a limit.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 92.

Indeed, the analyst, of all those whose orders of discourse are sustained currently (*actuellement*) – and that word is not nothing, provided we give 'action' its full Aristotelian meaning – is the one who, by putting down object *a* in the place of semblance, is in the best position to do what should rightfully (*juste*) be done, namely, to investigate the status of truth as knowledge.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 95.

To appeal to the true, as we are often let to do, is simply to recall that one must not make the mistake of believing that we are already at the level of semblance (*dans le semblant*).

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 95.

Once one enters into the register of the true, one can no longer exit it. In order to relegate the truth to the lowly status it deserves, one must have entered into analytic discourse. What analytic discourse dislodges, puts truth in its place, but does not shake it up. It is reduced but indispensable.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 108.

Elsewhere:

To distinguish between true and false psychoanalysis we refer to a notion of authentic psychoanalysis, and to a notion of a psychoanalysis that conforms to the truth that is manifested by the experience it entails. What is at issue here, however, is truth as such, in so far as both in the realm of its discovery and in the realm in which it operates with curative aims, man's relationship to truth predominates.

Lacan, J., "True Psychoanalysis, and False," *Hurly-Burly 11*, 2014, p. 15.

You go first, Lady Truth, the *trou*, the hole, is just down there, and that's your place.

In the end, this non-knowledge is a *trou-vaille*, a find. There's no better when it comes to introducing lasting confusion on a delicate subject, the point in question in psychoanalysis, which I've just called the palpable frontier between truth and knowledge.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 11.

A truth has no content. A truth is said to be such is either truth or else semblance, this being a distinction that has nothing to do with the opposition between true or false, because if it is semblance, it a semblance, precisely, of truth.

Mathematical incomprehension comes from the question as to whether, truth or semblance, this might not be all One.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 48.

This enables us to see what is at issue topologically when we are told, next, *Between man and the world* - this world that is substituted for the volatilization of the sexual partner – *there is a wall*. The wall is the site at which the turning back occurs, which the other day I introduced as the signifier of the junction between truth and knowledge. I'm not the one who said there was a cut. It was a poet from *Papouasie* who said there was a wall. It's not a wall. It's simply the locus of castration. This means that knowledge leaves the field of truth intact, and vice versa.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 96-97.

Why couldn't the family, society itself, be creations built from repression? They are nothing less. That, however, may be because the unconscious ex-sists, is motivated by the structure, that is, by language. Freud is so far from excluding this solution that it's in order to come to some decision on it that he works so hard on the case of the Wolf Man, a man who ends up in rather bad shape. Still it would seem that this failure, failure of the case, is relatively unimportant when compared with his success: that of establishing the real within the facts.

Lacan J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 28.

JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER

A little earlier, Lacan had inscribed his famous truth in the register of logic, saying that truth is nothing more than a series of signifiers affected by the letter T, as in logic when one says *that's true*. But *to be true* is nothing more than this: one has inscribed a letter, the letter T, at the end of this chain of signifiers. It is no more than a convention of writing. Lacan could then say "*la vérité souffre tout*", that *truth suffers all* – one can do anything in the name of truth. This even brings truth to the point of being no more than a signification of truth, an effect of the signifying chain, an effect with a special meaning.

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 109.

I believe you see what I am getting at in my fantasy: I am getting to where I can write S2 also in the fourth place. S2, knowledge in the place of the truth/lie, does not seem to me to be out of place today in civilization. The notion that knowledge is nothing but a *semblant* has attracted a great many followers and puts pressure on us.

Miller, J.-A., "A Fantasy," *Psychoanalytical Notebook 34*, 2019, p. 145.

On the one hand, the surplus-jouissance commands; on the other, the subject works; and on again another, identifications fall and are replaced by the homogenous evaluation of capacities, and this while knowledge of different sorts is busy telling lies and yet makes headway nonetheless.

Miller, J.-A., "A Fantasy," *Psychoanalytical Notebook 34*, 2019, p. 148.

One might also say that this is true also of time, that there is also (we invent this) a *horror temporis*, a horror of time. And it is not only being which one removes from time, but also truth. The relationships of truth and time have always been difficult for thought, as though the truth always had a natural pretension for being outside time. Deleuze said it well: "time puts truth in crisis."

Miller, J.-A., "Introduction to the Erotics of Time," *Lacanian Ink 24/25*, 2005, pp. 17-18.

Freud takes the thing seriously and asks himself: 'What is truth in psychoanalysis?' The word 'construction' is a bit heavy. Calling the text 'Truth in Psychoanalysis' might have had more appeal for us.

Miller, J.-A., "Marginalia to 'Constructions in Analysis'," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 22*, 2011, p. 51.

What happens if we say something false? If we, the analyst, say something false? What guarantee do we have? The word 'guarantee' is in the text: 'What guarantee [do] we have, during the work on constructions, that we are not going wrong?' So, we have the problem of error, of guarantee, and in a certain sense, of the guarantee of truth.

Miller, J.-A., "Marginalia to 'Constructions in Analysis'," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 22*, 2011, p. 53.

In Lacan, construction and interpretation stand in opposition like knowledge and truth. The construction is an elaboration of knowledge, whilst the interpretation has something of the oracle. Lacan refers very little to construction as such, he takes little interest in it because in his work it's called 'structure.'

Miller, J.-A., "Marginalia to 'Constructions in Analysis'," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 22*, 2011, p. 57.

In effect, if the schizophrenic is this subject for whom all the symbolic is real, it is truly from his subjective position that it can become apparent that the symbolic is but *semblant* for all the other subjects. The revolving circle of the four discourses singled out and formalised by Lacan, is truly designed to show that there is no discourse that is not of *semblant*. And this circle itself can only be conceived on the basis of the subject outside discourse.

Miller, J.-A., "Ironic Clinic," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 7*, 2001, p. 11.

https://london society-nls.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/miller-jacques-alain_ironic-clinic.pdf

The secret of the universal clinic of delusion is that the referent is always void. If there is truth, it is not of the order of an adequation of the word and the thing. The truth is internal to the 'saying' [*le dire*], that is to say, to the articulation. In this sense the signifier, insofar as it is articulated to the signifier, implies that the referent is empty, and this is what constitutes the symbolic as an order, the symbolic order as Lacan named it. It is the very movement that we observe in Freud when he goes from factual seduction to the fantasmatic one, from fact to fantasy, from the search for exactness to the scansion of truth, from the unconscious as referential knowledge to the unconscious as textual knowledge.

Miller, J.-A., "Ironie Clinic," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 7, 2001, p. 15. https://london-society-nls.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/miller-jacques-alain_ironic-clinic.pdf

'I, truth, speak.' When Lacan makes truth speak, it is as an enigma of truth, and not as truth that says what it is. This is not truth that speaks clearly, that speaks directly, that allows you to make head or tail of it. On the contrary, this is the truth that, as he puts it, 'slips away as soon as she appears.'

Miller, J.-A., "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 40.

But although psychoanalysis is not some knowledge in the real, it benefits from knowledge in the real, it can make believe that the production of signifiers in free association necessarily responds to a law and that this law is decipherable.

Miller, J.-A., "The Pass of Psychoanalysis Toward Science: The Desire for Knowledge," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 76.

The desire for knowledge is, thus, not the desire of science. It proceeds in the following manner: the subject puts the signifier to work and a knowledge results from it, transmissible without the subject; while the analyst puts to work the subject, and not the signifier.

Miller, J.-A., "The Pass of Psychoanalysis Toward Science: The Desire for Knowledge," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 77.

The question of truth, where all of humanist desire is placed, rises up to make a barrier against scientific knowledge. Nowadays, this is done quite often in the name of ethics.

Miller, J.-A., "The Pass of Psychoanalysis Toward Science: The Desire for Knowledge," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 78.

The desire to deal with this question in an unprecedented manner is what Lacan calls 'desire for knowledge,' which is like the transformation of the desire of science when it touches upon that which it excludes, and even what it forecloses, namely, the question of truth.

Miller, J.-A., "The Pass of Psychoanalysis Toward Science: The Desire for Knowledge," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 79.

[W]omen may be better able to identify with truth than men. Men more easily identify with knowledge and perhaps women more easily identify with truth, and are even identified with truth by men.

Miller J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 12.

[T]here is another truth other than the truth which is the opposite of falsehood. There is a truth which stands over or grounds both of them and which is related to the very fact of formulating, for I can say nothing without positing it as true.

Miller J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 14.

[T]he truth inscribes itself, inserts itself in the discontinuities of the real.

Miller J.-A., "Six Paradigms of Jouissance," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 34, 2019, p. 50.

[T]ruth occupies the place where jouissance is annulled, mortified. We would have to add-*truth, the sister of forbidden jouissance*. This is why it is necessary to complete things with what Lacan has to say [...] – *truth is the dear little sister of impotence*.

Miller J.-A., "Six Paradigms of Jouissance," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 34, 2019, p. 56.

The true is adrift where the real is concerned. This phenomenon of drifting is due to the fact that truth is only accessible through knowledge [...] against a background of the field of language, there is no direct relationship to truth, but only one mediated by knowledge: truth is only attained through its effects.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Lapsus," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 69.

The Freudian text is true (*veritable*) speech which has the value of transference. The truth-effect there in situ is the subject supposed to know.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Lapsus," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 75.

That is, the categories are not founded in nature, nor are they structural, nor are they in the real. It appears to me that the categories are founded only in a certain kind of truth.

Miller, J.-A., "Lacan's Nightingale," online: <https://www.lacan.com/jamnigh.htm>

However, the truth has variations, as Lacan expressed with his neologism *varité*, variety. This neologism connotes both truth and variety simultaneously. Our categories produce truth effects, but, at bottom, the truth is not grounded in the real.

Miller, J.-A., "Lacan's Nightingale," online: <https://www.lacan.com/jamnigh.htm>

The unconscious is capable, as he formulates it in the *Traumdeutung*, of producing effects *out of the bounds of the subject's knowledge*. It imposes itself with a real, effective status.

Miller, J.-A., "Unconscious Knowledge and the Unconscious Subject," *The Lacanian Review* 17, 2025, p. 23.

The problem of the relation between truth and jouissance *is* Lacan's problem. It is the problem of psychoanalysis as Lacan constituted it, treated it, and tormented it, as it tormented him, and as Lacanians have inherited it.

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 105.

The relation at issue is a relation of cause to effect. The problem trades on the following question: why and in what way can truth be the cause of an effect on jouissance, given that truth and jouissance are not cut from the same cloth, you might say, that they are heterogeneous, heteroclite?

Miller, J.-A., "A New Alliance with Jouissance," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 106.

ÉRIC LAURENT

Lacan stresses that truth, in this experiment [“Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty”] while attained independently by each individual, has the structure of a collective calculus: it can only be attained through the others. When he says that truth can only be attained ‘*par les autres*’ (through the others), this is a direct response to Sartre’s “hell is other people.” Laurent, É., “Alienation and Separation (I),” *Reading Seminar XI: Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, eds. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 23.

Only in psychoanalysis can the relations between truth and knowledge illuminate the semblances that render a human order possible, even though it subverts the order of things installed by the master.

Laurent, É., “Symptom and Discourse,” *Jacques Lacan & the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII*, eds. J. Clemens & R. Grigg, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2006, p. 238.

Beyond its [interpretation’s] variety of support, it must be guided by the search for a truth effect conceived as a rupture. Its ‘*n’importe quoi*’ is thus not equivalent to any intervention by the psychoanalyst, it must also want to produce an effect of rupture of truth – which is neither simply *adequatio*, nor the production of any meaning whatever – and take account of the aporias of this aim.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: from Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 118.

The new signifier comes to be inscribed on a surface where no glimmer of meaning comes to be inscribed. It remains the pure trace of an outside-meaning that has finally extinguished the false shimmers of the belief in the symptom.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: from Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 132.

But what Lacan is highlighting is that the level of opposition between the true and the false, insufficient to qualify what is involved in the analytic experience is the place in reserve of truth as that which can make a hole, make a hole in discourse, and that this place is occupied by the psychoanalyst who has authorized the discourse of ‘free association,’ which Lacan clears of the historically connoted term of *association*, to qualify it simply as *free speech* [*discourse libre*].

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: From Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 119.

On the basis of a certain number of axioms about which nothing will be said, one then constructs a universe of discourse which generates proposition that are deduced from axioms. After this, everything is interpreted [*tout s’interprète*], everything is deduced, and it becomes possible to refer the propositions generated to the true or the false. At the end of the love affair with truth, one has, as an axiom, something which is written about which there is not very much to say.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: From Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, pp. 127-128.

The homology between the two places, between *orthè doxa* and the lie, is decisive in psychoanalysis in order to separate ourselves from the impasses inherent to an epistemology of the model.

Laurent, É., “The Case from Unease to the Lie,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 21, 2011, p. 87.

There is always a point at which a woman doesn't know that she is pregnant [...] there are very precise and delicate details that only appear in an analysis, but when one takes them into account, one can say that there is something that cannot be known, in the sense of a transparency of one's cognizance. Knowledge can be unknown, but not cognizance.

Laurent, É., "Speaking Through One's Symptom, Speaking Through One's Body," *Hurly Burly II*, 2014, p. 147.



Decalcomania, René Magritte

5 – Lifting the Veil, Revelation, Emergence

SIGMUND FREUD

What is a joke to me may be merely a comic story to other people. But if a joke admits of this doubt, the reason can only be that it has a façade – in these instances a comic one – in the contemplation of which one person is satiated while another may try to peer behind it. [...] this façade is intended to dazzle the examining eye [...] these stories have therefore something to conceal.

Freud, S., “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1960, pp. 105-106.

Anyone who has allowed the truth to slip out in an unguarded moment is in fact glad to be free of pretence.

Freud, S., “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1960, p. 106.

During the process of psycho-analysis it is not only the patient who plucks up courage, but his disease as well; it grows bold enough to speak more plainly than before.

Freud, S., “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis” (1909), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume X*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 223.

If neurotics are endowed with the evil characteristic of diverting their interest from the present and of attaching it to these regressive substitutes, the products of their imagination, then there is absolutely nothing for it but to follow upon their tracks and bring these unconscious productions into consciousness; for, leaving on one side their lack of value from the point of view of reality, they are of the utmost value from our point of view, since they are for the moment the bearers and possessors of the interest which we want to set free so as to be able to direct it on to the tasks of the present. The analysis would have to run precisely the same course as one which had a naïf faith in the truth of the phantasies.

Freud, S., “From the History of An Infantile Neurosis (Wolfman)” (1919), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, pp. 49-50.

We know now that the manifest content is a deception, a façade. [...] When the ‘content’ of the dream is spoken of, what must be referred to can only be the content of the preconscious thoughts and of the repressed wishful impulse which are revealed behind the facade of the dream by the work of interpretation.

Freud, S., “Some Additional Notes on Dream Interpretation as a Whole” (1925), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud XIX*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 131.

If the construction is wrong, there is no change in the patient; but if it is right or gives an approximation to the truth, he reacts to it with an unmistakable aggravation of his symptoms and of his general condition.

Freud, S., “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 23*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 265.

The discussion of the technical problem of how to accelerate the slow progress of an analysis leads us to another, more deeply interesting question: is there such a thing as a natural end to an analysis—is there any possibility at all of bringing an analysis to such an end?

Freud, S., “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1964, p. 219.

If this is the correct answer to our question, we may say that analysis, in claiming to cure neuroses by ensuring control over instinct, is always right in theory but not always right in practice.

Freud, S., “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” (1937), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1964, p. 229.

JACQUES LACAN

Écrits:

Truth manifests itself in this form as preceding error and advancing solely in the act that engenders its certainty; error, conversely, manifests itself as being confirmed by its inertia and correcting itself only with difficulty by following truth's conquering initiative.

Lacan, J., "Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 173.

Thus transference does not fall under any mysterious property of affectivity and, even when it reveals itself in an emotional [*émoi*] guise, this guise has a meaning only as a function of the dialectical moment at which it occurs.

Lacan, J., "Presentation on Transference," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 184.

The truth requires us to go out of our way. We cannot do so by simply getting used to it. We get used to reality [*réel*]. The truth we repress.

Lacan, J., "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 433.

For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier whose function, in the intrasubjective economy of analysis, may lift the veil from the function it served in the mysteries. For it is the signifier that is destined to designate meaning effects as a whole, insofar as the signifier conditions them by its presence as signifier.

Lacan, J., "The Signification of the Phallus," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 579.

But in Freud's work something quite different is at stake, which is a *savoir* certainly, but one that doesn't involve the slightest *connaissance*, in that it is inscribed in a discourse of which the subject – who, like the messenger slave of Antiquity, carries under his hair the codicil that condemns him to death – knows neither the meaning nor the text, nor in what language [*langue*] it is written, nor even that it was tattooed on his shaven scalp while he was sleeping.

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 680.

Let us recognize the subject's efficacy in the *gnomon* he erects, a *gnomon* that constantly indicates truth's site to him. Revealing that the phallus itself is nothing but the site of lack it indicates in the subject.

Lacan, J., "Science and Truth," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 745.

Seminars:

When you understand what is expressed in the signs of the language, it is always, in the end, on account of light coming to you from outside of the signs - either through an inner truth which allows you to recognize what is borne by signs, or by the presentation of an object which is correlated, in a repeated and insistent manner, with a sign. And here we have the perspective turned upside down. The truth is outside of the signs, elsewhere. This see-saw of Augustinian dialectic directs us towards the recognition of the authentic *magister*, of the inner master of truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York: Norton, 1988, p. 262.

Beyond alienated demand - in the system of discourse that is located at A, residing in the locus of the Other - the subject, propelling himself, wonders what he is as a subject. What must he encounter beyond the locus of truth?

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Polity, Cambridge, 2019, p. 294.

A veil is lifted, the one that weighs on the articulation of the unconscious line. This is the veil that we analysts try to lift in our clinical practice and, as you know, we certainly have our work cut out for us. Analysts' interventions aim to re-establish the coherence of the signifying chain at the level of the unconscious.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 296.

What one finds in *das Ding* is the true secret.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 46.

Das Ding is a primordial function which is located at the level of the initial establishment of the gravitation of the unconscious *Vorstellungen*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 62.

Things can branch off in every possible direction starting off from anxiety. What we were waiting for, when all's said and done, and which is the true substance of anxiety, is *that which deceives not*, that which is entirely free of doubt. Don't let yourselves be taken in by appearances. Just because anxiety's link to doubt, to hesitation, to the obsessional's so-called ambivalent game, may strike you as clinically tangible, this doesn't mean that they are the same thing. Anxiety is not doubt, anxiety is the cause of doubt.

[...] If there is one dimension wherein we have to search for the true function, the true weight, the sense behind keeping up the function of cause, then it lies in the direction of the opening that anxiety affords.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 76.

Discontinuity, then, is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to us as a phenomenon – discontinuity, in which something is manifested as a vacillation.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 25.

You will grant me that the *one* that is introduced by the experience of the unconscious is the one of the split, of the stroke, of rupture.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 26.

But it didn't occur to him that happiness can come from a truth strike. Given how heavily truth weighs on us at every instant of our existence, how happy we would be to no longer have any other relationship with truth than a collective one!

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVI: From an Other to the other*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2024, p. 30.

A dream wakes you up just when it might let the truth drop, so that the only reason one wakes up is so as to continue dreaming - dreaming in the real or, to be more exact, in reality.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 57.

For an interpretation is only rendered true by what it gives rise to, just like an oracle's pronouncements. Interpretation does not put truth to the test, leading [*se trancherait*] to a simple yes or no; it in fact *unleashes* the truth. It is true only inasmuch as it is truly followed by effects [or: corroborated, *suivie*]

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 5.

A truth effect is not mere semblance [or: based on semblance, *du semblant*]. The Oedipus complex is there to teach us that, real blood [or: red blood, *sang rouge*] is spilled. Yet the spilling of blood does not refute semblance; it colors it, renders it re-semblant, and propagates it.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 6.

The discourse of the unconscious is an emergence, the emergence of a certain signifying function. It existed prior to that as a sign [*enseigne*], which is why I situated it for you at the core of semblance.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 13.

For man, in this relation, woman is precisely the moment of truth. With regard to sexual jouissance, woman is in the position of highlighting the equivalence between jouissance and semblance. Therein lies the distance between man and her.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 25.

This semblance, which is exposed by pure truth, is [...] "rather phallic" [*assez phalle*, which sounds just like *acéphale*, acephalous], rather involved in what for us is initiated by virtue of coitus [...] involved enough, thus, to deserve the ancient name "phallus."

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, pp. 127-128.

Thus it is not where people think it is, but, rather, in her structure as a subject, that the hysteric [...] conjugates the truth of her jouissance with the implacable knowledge she has that the Other who is capable of causing that jouissance is the phallus—to wit, a semblance.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 132.

Analytic discourse is established by giving the hysteric back her truth. This sufficed to dissipate the theatrics in hysteria.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 136.

The letter of Freud's work is a written work. But what it sketches out with these writings surrounds a veiled, obscure truth, a truth that can be stated as follows: a relationship between the sexes, such as it occurs in any sexual act, is based on the compromise between [or: combining of, *composition entre*] jouissance and semblance that is known as castration.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 146.

The Other, the Other as the locus of truth, is the only place, albeit an irreducible place, that we can give to the term 'divine being,' God, to call him by his name.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 45.

'The true aims at the real' – that statement is the fruit of a long reduction of pretensions to truth. Wherever truth presents itself, asserts itself as if it were an ideal that could be based on speech, it is not so easily attained. If analysis rests on a presumption, it is that knowledge about truth can be constituted on the basis of its experience.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 1999, p. 91.

Elsewhere:

The psychoanalytic truth was that there was something terribly important at the bottom of it, in everything that gets hatched up when it comes to the interpretation of the truth, namely sexual life.

Lacan, J., *My Teaching*, trans. D. Macey, London: Verso, 2008, p. 17.

What is within reach is the fact that sexuality makes a hole in truth.

Lacan, J., *My Teaching*, trans. D. Macey, London: Verso, 2008, p. 21.

So when I talk about a hole in truth, it is not, naturally, a crude metaphor. It is not a hole in a jacket, it is the negative aspect that appears in anything to do with the sexual, namely its inability to aver. That is what a psychoanalysis is all about.

Lacan, J., *My Teaching*, trans. D. Macey, London: Verso, 2008, p. 22.

Should psychoanalysis succeed, it would die out, in being but a forgotten symptom. This would not surprise it; it is the destiny of truth, as it itself established from the start – truth gets forgotten. Thus everything depends on whether the real insists.

Lacan, J., "The Third", *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 92.

There are truths that are of the order of the real. If I distinguish between the real, the symbolic and the imaginary, it is because there are real, symbolic and imaginary truths. If there are truths about the real, it is because there are truths that we do not admit to ourselves.

Lacan, J., "Yale University Interview with Students, Answers to their Questions," *The Lacanian Review* 12, 2022, pp. 66-67.

But the end of the truth, the real truth, is that it doesn't work out between men and women.

Lacan, J., "Yale University, Kanzer Seminar," *The Lacanian Review* 12, 2022, p. 47.

The mirage of truth, from which only lies can be expected (which in polite circles is called resistance), has no other terminal point than the satisfaction that marks the end of an analysis.

Lacan, J., "Preface to the English Edition of *Seminar XI*," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 25.

I have left the pass at the disposal of those who take the risk of testifying as best one can to the lying truth.

Lacan, J., "Preface to the English Edition of *Seminar XI*," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 27.

JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER

Is the bone of an analysis death? Think of Hans Holbein's marvelous series of pictures in which death is depicted as a skeleton coming to pull the busy living by the sleeve to call them and remind them that death is the final truth [...] death appears as a function of truth.

Miller, J.-A., *Analysis Laid Bare*, trans. A. Duncan, New York: Lacanian Press, 2023, p. 19.

[Holbein's *The Ambassadors*] I have at times made this painting the emblem of the pass. The skull reveals itself only when one turns around to take a last look at the painting as one leaves the room. The pass is this last glance at one's analysis. Beneath the images, beneath the prestige, beneath the fascinations, beneath the movement of illusions, death would be the immobile and hard truth. Death is here the embodiment of truth.

Miller, J.-A., *Analysis Laid Bare*, trans. A. Duncan, New York: Lacanian Press, 2023, p. 20.

It is with regard to the symptom that we meet the burning question as to the correlation, the conjunction between the true and the real. In this sense, the symptom is Janus-like, two-faced, with a face of truth and a face of the real.

Miller, J.-A., "Reading a Symptom," *Hurly-Burly* 6, 2011, p. 149.

So, admittedly, to treat the symptom you have to pass through the shifting dialectic of desire, but you also have to rid yourself of the mirages of truth that this deciphering brings you and aim beyond, at the fixity of jouissance and the opacity of the real.

Miller, J.-A., "Reading a Symptom," *Hurly-Burly* 6, 2011, p. 152.

When Lacan makes truth speak, it is as an enigma of truth, and not as truth that says what it is.

Miller, J.-A., "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 40.

Truth emerges from a *fiat*. It is neither comparison nor adequacy. Truth abides by the act.

Miller, J.-A., "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 49.

One is not in analysis until one has had at least one revelation.

Miller, J.-A., "Truth is Coupled with Meaning," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 11.

There is a mode which is that of knowing-without-knowing, knowing without recognising this knowledge [...] In psychoanalysis, at every moment – obviously in some more than in others – one can catch a glimpse of the shimmering varieties of knowledge.

Miller, J.-A., "Truth is Coupled with Meaning," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 13.

The interpretation of the analyst, such as I understand it, must be thought of in relation to revelation. It is an aid to revelation. It can be an auxiliary revelation.

Miller, J.-A., "Truth is Coupled with Meaning," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 14.

The lifting of repression in order to discover what? Another truth [. . .] In other words, one must try to insinuate oneself at this point in such a way that here we find, not another truth, but the real.

Miller, J.-A., "Truth is Coupled with Meaning," *The Lacanian Review* 2, 2016, p. 18.

When one analyses the unconscious, the meaning of interpretation is the truth. When one analyses the speaking body, the meaning of interpretation is jouissance. This displacement from truth to jouissance sets the measure of what analytic practice is becoming in the era of the *parlêtre*.

Miller, J.-A., "The Unconscious and the Speaking Body," *Scilicet - The Speaking Body*, 2015, p. 42.

Ultimately, if one brings forth the formula — which is not Lacan's I hasten to say, but mine, I am trying it — that the real is contingent rather than impossible, one actually notices the relation between the real and the unconscious [...] One does not know when the dream will stir up an effect of emotion that one will translate in terms of truth. One does not know when you will do the act that will make you stumble, and about which you will explain in your story by saying It is because of that, implying an intention.

Miller, J.-A., "The Lying Truth," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p.151.

Likewise, we see that to situate the unconscious in relation to the real is entirely different from situating it in relation to the Other. To situate the unconscious in relation to the real amounts to saying that the unconscious is fundamentally a soliloquy, that the unconscious amounts to speaking alone in the semblance as a defence against the real. It amounts to rendering psychoanalysis an exception. Lacan's last teaching is situated along this edge.

Miller, J.-A., "The Semblant and the Real," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 9, 2002, p. 28.

Well, Lacan's last clinical theory has as its pivot-term the symptom, and in this theory, the absolute, the substance, is jouissance. To go back to the reference to Spinoza I had introduced in the beginning, it is really *Deus sive natura, sive jouissance*. That is, there is jouissance, to the detriment of truth and meaning. At that moment, it is no longer a question of there being a cure at the end of the analysis, nor is it a question of a traversing, it is only a question of the passage from one regime of jouissance to another, from a regime of suffering to a regime of pleasure.

Miller, J.-A., "Milanese Intuitions 2," *Mental* 12, 2003, p. 14.

In any case, 'the mirage of truth' has a 'terminal point,' that of the real unconscious which can be seen and appreciated from 'the satisfaction that marks the end of the analysis.'

Miller, J.-A., "Pass Bis," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 17, 2008, p. 100.

(Lacan) said that ‘true is what one believes to be such’ and what shines through on the other side is the idea of the real as un-knotted form all belief. How is this belief to be defined? I’m going to say: the lie in action, which has effects. [...] The truth, this truth, the truth of belief is, says Lacan, ‘drifting off course’ when the real is involved. [...] We may already assign this ‘drifting off course,’ which is not without an echo of the drive, to what is involved in the Pass bis [...] measuring what held the function of truth, in your analysis, with regard to the real [...]. Sizing the truth up to the real.

Miller, J.-A., “Pass Bis,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 17*, 2008, p. 101-102.

[H]allucinations are the mark of an irreducible real that surmounts the true. Hallucinations are the phenomena or manifestation of the real emerging in truth.

Miller, J.-A., “The Space of a Hallucination,” *The Lacanian Review 6*, 2018, p. 95.

With gathering momentum, the transcendental gives way to the pragmatic. This does not mean that there is no structure, that everything is semblance. There is the real, but it is much more difficult today than formerly to isolate and discern what is structure and what is real.

Mille, J.-A., “Six Paradigms of Jouissance,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks 34*, 2019, p. 77.

Astonishment is the true instant of seeing of this phase, and the moment to conclude must not efface its traumatic element.

Miller, J.-A., “The Space of a Lapsus,” *The Lacanian Review 6*, 2018, p. 75.

In an analysis that starts, the effects of revelation imply that one did not know it before, not in the same way at least [...] It is not at all the case in an analysis that lasts, where the central opposition is rather between the unconscious as knowledge and jouissance.

Miller, J.-A., “Psychoanalysis Has a Structure of Fiction,” *The Lacanian Review 7*, 2019, p. 145.

Truth is the substance of the analytic experience – its daily bread, I said. It produces some truth. It holds simply because there are revelations, illuminations, instants of seeing, what anglophones call *insight*. [...] But the truths produced by the analytic experience are mortal, they are situated at the level of the *patheme*, of what is felt, they are the truths that are pathetic. They are variable at this level, which had led Lacan to create the neologism of ‘*varité*,’ a variable truth.

Miller, J.-A., “Psychoanalysis Has a Structure of Fiction,” *The Lacanian Review 7*, 2019, p. 143.

Lacan famously stated: ‘there is no sexual relationship.’ It is the only universal that matters for a subject. However, it is a negative universal that signifies the absence of a rule, which permits the passage to the limit, the fact that makes the relationship between two members of the human species especially open to variation in comparison to other animal species. Open both to truth and lies. Open to variation, to contingency and to invention.

Miller, J.-A., “Lacan’s Nightingale,” online: <https://www.lacan.com/jamnigh.htm>

‘The big secret of Psychoanalysis’ Lacan thus wanted to give this formula the value of a revelation, in the sense of a discovery, the bringing to light of a hidden truth. But a truth hidden from whom? What one understands is that the big secret is a truth hidden first and foremost from psychoanalysts themselves, a truth unknown to the practitioners of psychoanalysis.

Miller, J.-A., “The Other without Other,” *Hurly-Burly 10*, 2013, pp. 15-16.

ÉRIC LAURENT

To the interpretation that produces meaning that can be understood, without any limit, Lacan opposes the truth effect of interpretation in so far as it refers to a fundamental void, a first absence. Interpretation thus finds its basis as a reprise of the insertion into the signifier of what he calls, in a remarkable way, *life*.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: From Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 120.

The lightnings of the unconscious, the lightning of the parlêtre, does not only include the lightning that depends on the signifying chain. *The lightning governs all*, the lightning flash governs all the signifiers in a compact chain. At the end of analysis, these detach themselves as “spare parts” [*pièces détachées*] – as J.-A. Miller indicates – S1, S1, S1, a swarm [*essaim*] which is no longer bound, compacted in a chain, but returned to fundamental chance. The lightning is also an event of the body which comes to mark LOM, who has a body and who suffers from it. The event of jouissance which comes to mark the body with its branding iron is also a lightning strike, but different from the previous one. As Lacan brought to light in *Seminar XXIII*, the lightning of the body event introduces an equivocal, a fissure in the body, sometimes in an instantaneous way.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: from Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 125.

Further, the subject must also “recognise the part he has played” in this game played logically, like all great games. This participation is the way in which the subject will have, in return, a hold on the truths revealed to him in the course of the analysis.

Laurent, É., “The Case, from Unease to the Lie,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 22, 2011, p. 85.

[I]f we designate the subject as a cut, as a point from ‘nowhere,’ then truths appear, reduced however, to ‘lifestyles.’ This allows us to console ourselves for the fact that, if neither a universal point of view exists nor private language exists, nevertheless something remains that can be shared by subjects.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation and Truth,” *Bulletin of the NLS*, 2008, p. 79.



The Lovers, René Magritte

6 – Study: Truth, Speech and Saying

SIGMUND FREUD

I can deliberately decide to make an allusion. In such a case I begin by having a direct expression of my thought in my mind (in my inner ear); I inhibit myself from expressing it owing to a misgiving related to the external situation, and can almost be said to make up my mind to replace the direct expression by another form of indirect expression; and I then produce an allusion.

Freud, S., “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1960, pp. 167-168.

Nothing distinguishes jokes more clearly from all other psychical structures than this double-sidedness and this duplicity in speech. From this point of view at least the authorities come closest to an understanding of the nature of jokes when they lay stress on ‘sense in nonsense.’

Freud, S., “Jokes and their relation to the Unconscious” (1905), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1960, p. 172.

If one listens patiently to a melancholic's many and various self-accusations, one cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all applicable to the patient himself, but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, someone whom the patient loves, has loved or should love.

Freud, S., "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV*, London: Vintage, 2001, p. 248.

It appears, therefore, that the direct utterances of the patient after he has been offered a construction afford very little evidence upon the question whether we have been right or wrong. It is of all the greater interest that there are indirect forms of confirmation which are in every respect trustworthy. One of these is a form of words that is used (as though by general agreement) with very little variation by the most different people: 'I didn't ever think' (or 'I shouldn't ever have thought') 'that' (or 'of that'). This can be translated without any hesitation into: 'Yes, you're right this time—about my unconscious.'

Freud, S., "Constructions in Analysis" (1937), *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII*, London: Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 263.

JACQUES LACAN

Écrits:

For 'truth' is the name of the ideal movement that this discourse introduces into reality. In short, *psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience*, and this notion should prevail when raising the question of the nature of transference.

Lacan, J., "Presentation on Transference," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 177.

Now all speech calls for a response, I will show that there is no speech without a response, even if speech meets only with silence, provided it has an auditor, and this is the heart of its function in analysis.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 206.

Even if it communicates nothing, discourse represents the existence of communication; even if it denies the obvious, it affirms that speech constitutes truth; even if it is destined to deceive, it relies on faith in testimony.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 209.

Let's be categorical: in psychoanalytic anamnesis, what is at stake is not reality, but truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by the scant freedom through which the subject makes them present.

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 213.

Its [the method's] means are those of speech, insofar as speech confers a meaning on the functions of the individual; its domain is that of concrete discourse qua field of the subject's emergence of truth in reality [*réel*].

Lacan, J., "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 214.

But now the truth in Freud's mouth takes the said bull [*bête*] by the horns: "To you I am thus the enigma of she who slips away as soon as she appears, you men who try so hard to hide me under the tawdry finery of your proprieties. Still, I admit your embarrassment is sincere, for even when you take it upon yourselves to become my heralds, you acquire no greater worth by wearing my colors than your own clothes, which are like you, phantoms that you are. Where am I going, having passed into you? And where was I prior to that? Will I perhaps tell you someday? But so that you will find me where I am, I will teach you by what sign you can recognize me. Men, listen, I am telling you the secret. I, truth, speak.

Lacan, J., "The Freudian Thing," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 340.

I wander about in what you regard as least true by its very nature: in dreams, in the way the most far-fetched witticisms and the most grotesque nonsense of jokes defy meaning, and in chance—not in its law, but rather in its contingency. And I never more surely proceed to change the face of the world than when I give it the profile of Cleopatra's nose.

Lacan, J., "The Freudian Thing," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 342.

"Listen carefully to what he says, and – as he said it of me, the truth that speaks – the best way to grasp it is to take it quite literally. Here, no doubt, things are my signs, but, I repeat, signs of my speech.

Lacan, J., "The Freudian Thing," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 342.

A true teaching, that is, teaching that constantly subjects itself to what is known as renewal. For the pact instituting analytic experience must take into account the fact that this experience instates the very effects that capture it, diverting it from the subject.

Freud is referring to this connection with truth when he declares that it is impossible to meet three challenges: to educate, govern, and psychoanalyse.

Lacan, J., "The Freudian Thing," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 362.

This is a function of speech that is more worthy of being pointed out than that of disguising the subject's thought (which is usually indefinable) – namely, the function of indicating the place of this subject in the search for truth.

Lacan, J., "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 421.

This passion of the signifier thus becomes a new dimension of the human condition in that it is not only man who speaks, but in man and through man that it [*ça*] speaks; in that his nature becomes woven by effects in which the structure of the language of which he becomes the material can be refound; and in that the relation of speech thus resonates in him, beyond anything that could have been conceived of by the psychology of ideas.

Lacan, J., "The Signification of the Phallus," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 578.

This truth lies at the heart of all the defects found in the psychoanalytic field regarding sexual life. [...] to disguise its gap by assuming that the virtue of the 'genital' will resolve it through the maturation of tenderness [...] is nonetheless fraudulent.

Lacan, J., "The Signification of the Phallus," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 580.

The cut made by the signifying chain is the only cut that verifies the structure of the subject as a discontinuity in the real. If linguistics enables us to see the signifier as the determinant of the signified, analysis reveals the truth of this relationship by making holes in meaning the determinants of its discourse.

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 678.

An enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that renounces itself, an ignorance that sweeps itself away, an opportunity that self-destructs – what remains here if not the trace of what really must be in order to fall away from being?

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 678.

The subject's submission to the signifier, which occurs in the circuit that goes from S(A) to A and back from A to J(A), is truly a circle, inasmuch as the assertion that is established in it—being unable to close on anything but its own scansion, in other words, failing an act in which it would find its certainty – refers back only to its own anticipation in the composition of the signifier which is in itself meaningless [*insignifiante*].

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, pp. 682-683.

[F]antasy is really the "stuff" of the *I* that is primally repressed, because it can be indicated only in the fading* of enunciation.

Lacan, J., "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 691.

To lend my voice to support these intolerable words, 'I, truth, speak...' goes beyond allegory. Which quite simply means everything that can be said of truth, of the only truth – namely, that there is no such thing as a metalanguage [...], no language being able to say the truth about truth, since truth is grounded in the fact that truth speaks, and that it has no other means by which to become grounded.

This is precisely why the unconscious, which tells the truth about truth, is structured like a language.

Lacan, J., "Science and Truth," *Écrits*, trans. B. Fink, New York/London: Norton, 2006, p. 737.

Seminars:

[I]n order to deceive, speech affirms itself as true. That is for the one who listens. For the one who speaks deception itself requires from the beginning the support of the truth that must be dissembled, and, as it unfolds, it presupposes a veritable deepening of the truth to which, if one can put it this way, it replies.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 263.

Every act of speech which is formulated as such brings into the world the novelty of the emergence of meaning. It is not that it is affirmed as truth, but rather that it introduces the dimension of truth into the real.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 263.

In other words, in discourse it is contradiction which sorts truth from error.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York/London: Norton, 1988, p. 264.

Even through his body, the subject emits a speech, which is, as such, speech of truth, a signifying speech he does not even know he emits. It is because he always says more than he means to, always more than he thinks he says.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique*, ed. J.-A., Miller, trans. J. Forrester, New York: Norton, 1988, p. 266.

What the subject tells me is always fundamentally related to a possible feint, in which he sends me, and I receive, the message in an inverted form. There you have both sides of the structure, foundational speech and lying speech which is deceptive as such.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 37.

When Freud formulated the term *unconscious thought*, adding *sit venia verbo* in his *Traumdeutung*, he was saying nothing other than that *thought* means the thing articulated in language.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1993, p. 112.

To trace it out once again, the intersection of demand's intention and the signifying chain occurs for the first time at point A, which we have defined as the Other with a capital O, qua locus of truth. This is the locus in which speech is situated. Taking up its place there, speech establishes the order of truth, an order that is evoked and invoked whenever the subject articulates something, whenever he speaks. Indeed, speech does something that is different from all the immanent forms of captivation of one [person] with respect to another, since it establishes a third element – namely, the locus of the Other in which speech is inscribed as truth even when it lies.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VI: Desire and its Interpretation*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2019, p. 294.

It is precisely for this reason and no other that, detached from us, our voice appears to us with a foreign sound. It is proper to the structure of the Other to constitute a certain void, the void of its lack of guarantee. Truth comes into the world with the signifier, prior to any control. This truth is felt, it is reflected back only by echoes in the real. Now, the voice resonates in this void as a voice that is distinct from sonorities. It is not a modulated voice, but an articulated one. The voice at issue here is the voice as an imperative, a voice that demands obedience or conviction. It is not situated in relation to music, but in relation to speech.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2016, p. 275.

They should know that for some years all my effort has been required in a struggle to bring to the attention of these practitioners the true value of this instrument, *speech* – to give it back its dignity, so that it does not always represent for them those words, devalued in advance, that force them to fix their gaze elsewhere, in order to find their guarantor.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 18.

Now, this is also the point from which he speaks, since in so far as he speaks, it is in the locus of the Other that he begins to constitute that truthful lie by which is initiated that which participates in desire at the level of the unconscious.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A. Sheridan, New York/London: Norton, 1977, p. 144.

As I reminded you last time, I was very kind to truth in an article I wrote [“The Freudian Thing”]. I had it make the most intelligent remarks I could attribute to it, borrowing them from what I say when I do not speak the truth. In other words, no discourse can speak the truth. A discourse that holds up [*tient*] is one that can hold up rather a long time without you having to ask it to account for its truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVI: From an Other to the other*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2024, p. 31.

If there is one thing that our entire approach delimits, and that has surely been renewed by analytic experience, it is that the only way in which to evoke the truth is by indicating that it is only accessible through a half-saying [*mi-dire*], that it cannot be said completely, for the reason that beyond this half there is nothing to say.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. Russell Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 51.

The truth depends only [...] on my utterance, namely on whether I state it appropriately. The true is not internal to the proposition, where only the fact, the factitious nature, of language is declared.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 60.

I mean that the true can only be found outside all propositions. To say that the true is inseparable from the effects of language, considered as such, is to include the unconscious within them.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 62.

What have I said, in effect, about any possible saying in the place of truth? The truth, I have been saying, can only be stated via a half-saying [mi-dire], and I have given you a model for it in the enigma. For this is how it is always presented to us, and certainly not in the form of a question.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg, New York/London: Norton, 1991, p. 103.

If speech that is enunciated is true – because it is always very authentically what it is, at the level that we are, that of the objective and of articulation – then semblance is established as the specific object of what is produced solely in the said discourse.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 10.

I emphasized first, that the semblance that presents itself as what it is, is the primary function of truth. There is a certain “I am speaking” that does that, and it is not superfluous to recall this to mind to properly situate truth, for truth poses many logical difficulties.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 16.

Semblance is not only locatable and essential in order to designate the primary function of truth; it is impossible to qualify the status of discourse without referring to it.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 17

[W]ithout writing, it is nevertheless impossible to question anew what results first and foremost from the effect of language as such – in other words, from the symbolic order, that is, the dimension (I’m saying that to please you, but you know that I introduced another term, “demansion,” the residence or locus) of truth as Other.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 51.

Something thus happens that is legible in the oh-so-precious function of hysterics: they are the ones who speak the truth regarding the relationship between the sexes. [...] To give meaning to Freud’s discovery, we must set out from the fact that neurosis, or at least one of the neuroses – I will demonstrate it for the other one, too – is nothing but the strict point where the truth of a failure is articulated (which is no less true everywhere else than where truth is spoken).

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 123.

In order for truth to make itself heard, it is enough for it to say ‘I speak,’ and we believe it because it is true. [...] Qua truth, it can say nothing other than semblance regarding jouissance, and it is regarding sexual jouissance that it wins every time.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVIII: On a Discourse that Might not Be a Semblance*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. B. Fink, Cambridge: Polity, 2025, p. 126.

Whenever logic is at issue, it is necessary to create the fiction of metalanguage. That is within a discourse, one forges what is known as an object-language, in view of which it is language that becomes *meta*. [...] *There is no such thing as metalanguage* denies that this division can be upheld. That there could be any discordance in language is foreclosed by this formula.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 4.

[W]hat [Freud] calls *the economy of the psyche*, namely the organization to which he deemed he should entrust the re-launch of his doctrine, stems indeed from the error he made when tying the ego, without any relay, with *Massenpsychologie* [...] He wanted to establish the safeguarding of a kernel of truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 147.

One must resolve to speak this truth as a fundamental position [...] what, then, is the knowledge that is assumed by truth. It is nothing but what stems from what is noted as a result of the fact of positing truth on the basis of the signifier.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 152.

Logic is a matter of ascertaining in grammar what takes shape as the position of truth, which in language makes it suitable for forming truth. *Suitable* does not mean that it will invariably succeed. So, in carefully seeking out its forms, one believes one is approaching what is involved in truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 152.

Truth already implies discourse. This doesn't mean that it can be said [...]. However, for jouissance to exist, one has to be able to speak about it. In view of which, there is something else, which is called *the fact of saying*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 202.

Everything that is said is semblance. What's more, everything that is said is true. All that is said gives rise to jouissance. As I have written again today on the blackboard, *Qu'on dise, comme fait...* this fact of saying ... *reste oublié derrière ce qui est dit*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2011, p. 205.

The real is what commands the entire function of *signifiance*. The real is what you encounter precisely on account of not being able, in mathematics, to write just any old thing. The real is what is entailed in the fact that, in the most commonplace function, you are immersed in *signifiance*, yet you cannot grasp all the signifiers at the same time. This is forbidden by their very structure. When you have some, a mass of them, you no longer have the others. They are repressed. This does not mean that you don't utter them nonetheless. Precisely, they are said *inter*. There is an *inter-diction*. It doesn't stop you from uttering them. But they are said censured. Either everything that psychoanalysis possesses no meaning and can be slung in the bin, or else what I'm telling you here has to be your home truth.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 19.

I said that it's a question of formulating the function of speech. A very long time ago I asserted that the function of speech is to be the only form of action that posits itself as truth. It is an otiose question to ask oneself what speech is. Not only do I speak, do you speak, and even *ça parle, it speaks*, as I said, but this carries on all by itself. It's a fact, and I would even say that it lies at the origin of all facts, because whatever might be at issue only assumed the rank of a fact *when it has been said*.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 55.

That which speaks [...] – whatever it is – [...], is that which derives jouissance from the self as a body. The fact of speaking [...] – in the current state of our knowledge – [...] refers only to this. It derives jouissance from a body that it experiences as tuable, that is, as a body that it can address in the tu form and a body to which it can say tue-toi, kill yourself, in the same line. What is psychoanalysis? It is the tracking of what is comprehended by way of obfuscation, of what is obfuscated in comprehension, due to the fact of a signifier that has marked a point of the body.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 130.

Where did I say that the knowledge from which this voice originates would be semblance? [...] Since it's clear that this knowledge is not the esoteric aspect of jouissance, nor merely the *savoir faire* of making a face, one must resolve to speak of truth as a fundamental position, even if not all is known about this truth, since I define it by its half-saying, by the fact that it cannot come more than midday.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, pp. 151-152.

Knowledge about truth is useful for the analyst to the extent that it allows him to widen a little his relation to these subjects-effects, which I said he authorizes by leaving the field open to the analysand's discourse.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 153.

There is one facet of knowledge about truth that derives its strength from entirely neglecting its content. This hammers home how the signifying articulation is its time and its place, and it does so to such an extent that something is shown which is nothing but this articulation.

The *monstration* of this articulation, in the passive sense, finds itself assuming an active sense and imposing itself as a *demonstration* to the speaking being who, in this instance, can only acknowledge, for the signifier, not merely inhabiting it but being no more than its mark. The freedom to choose one's axioms, that is to say, the point of departure chosen for this demonstration, consists solely in undergoing its consequences as a subject, consequences that, for their part, are not free.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 154.

The One does not *think itself*, even all alone, but it says something, and this is even what distinguishes it. The One didn't wait for people to ask in its regard the question of what this means from the standpoint of truth. It didn't even wait for logic. For this is what logic is. Logic is a matter of ascertaining in grammar what takes shape as the position of truth, which in language makes it suitable for forming truth. *Suitable* does not mean that it will invariably succeed. So, in carefully seeking out its forms, one believes one is approaching what is involved in truth. However, before Aristotle became aware of this relation to grammar, the One had already spoken, and not to say just anything. The One says what it has to say. In the *Parmenides*, it is the One that *se dit*, that *says itself*. It *says itself* – it has to be said – in aiming to be true, hence the tizzy that naturally arises from it as a result.

Lacan, J., *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XIX: ... or Worse*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A.R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, p. 162.

Elsewhere:

True psychoanalysis has its foundation in man's relation to speech. This determination, expressed as it is in a self-evident statement, is the axis according to which its effects must be judged and gauged, effects which are to be understood in the widest possible sense, that is, not only as changes that are beneficial in various ways, but as revealing an indisputable order in hitherto inexplicable facts, which ought truly to be called the appearance of new facts.

Lacan, J., "True Psychoanalysis, and False," *Hurly-Burly 11*, 2014, p. 15.

Truth begins to be established only once language exists. If the unconscious were not language, what might be called the unconscious in the Freudian sense would have no privilege, would be of no interest.

Lacan, J., *My Teaching*, trans. David Macey, London: Verso, 2008, p. 29.

Speech defines the place of what is called truth. [. . .]

In truth - quite literally on this occasion – truth speaks the truth, and not by half, only in one case. When it says, *I'm lying*. This is the only case in which one can be sure truth is not lying, because it is presumed to know it. But Otherwise, that is, *Autrement*, with a capital A, it's quite possible that truth none the less speaks the truth without knowing it.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 19.

The truth in question in psychoanalysis is what, by means of language – I mean through the function of speech - approaches something that is real.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 54.

What does psychoanalysis say? It says that, in this relationship with *jouissance*, it is speech that assures its dimension of truth. And, still, it remains no less assured that speech cannot tell the truth completely. It can only, as I have expressed it, *half-say* this relationship, and forge a semblance thereof, the semblance of what is called a man or a woman.

Lacan, J., *Talking to Brick Walls*, trans. A. R. Price, Cambridge: Polity, 2017, p. 59.

I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there is no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet it's through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real.

Lacan J., *Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson, New York/London: Norton, 1990, p. 3.

As for Descartes, he makes no mistake about it; God is the saying [*Dieu, c'est le dire*]. He saw clearly that what makes truth come into being, what decides the matter and however it wants, is *Dieure*. It is enough to *endieure* like me, that's the truth, there's no escaping it. If God deceives me, well too bad, it is truth by *direvine decree* [*decrét de dieure*], the golden truth.


Lacan, J., "The Third," *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 86.

Truth has a fictional structure because it passes through language and language has a fictional structure. It can only be half-said. Swear to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, the whole truth: it is precisely what will not be told. If the subject has a little idea, it is precisely what he will not say.

Lacan, J., "Yale University Interview with Students, Answers to their Questions," *The Lacanian Review* 12, 2022, p. 66.

S1 is that by which the subject is represented: a word [*une parole*], the speaking being. It is insofar as the subject says anything that it [*ca*] goes to the place of truth.

Lacan, J., "MIT Lecture on Topology," *The Lacanian Review* 5, 2018, p. 37.

The analyst is incarnated by a semblant of (*a*); he is, in sum, produced by the act of speaking the truth, such as it occurs in the relation S1  S2.

Lacan, J., "MIT Lecture on Topology," *The Lacanian Review* 5, 2018, p. 37.

Truth is characterized by reason of this S2: the analysand only says words, the one who is supposed to know something is the analyst: pure supposition, of course. This S2, that the analyst is supposed to know, is never completely said; it is only said in the form of half – saying the truth.

Lacan, J., "MIT Lecture on Topology," *The Lacanian Review* 5, 2018, p. 38.

JACQUES-ALAIN MILLER

Operating by means of the effects of truth does not entail believing in it, but on the contrary should liberate one from it. Belief in the true is shared by psychoanalysis and religion, notably by the religion that calls itself the true religion. The movement that obsessed Lacan - and to which, he said, he did not have all the keys – was, in some way, to force psychoanalysis outside of itself by obliging it to consider the way it operates from another perspective than that of truth. That perspective is the perspective of the real.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Lapsus," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, pp. 69-71.

But, in this principle one has to suppose that the necessity to articulate is transferred onto the spark which then gives meaning to or interprets the text, with the recommendation of not giving a rendezvous to truth in advance. It's a matter of maintaining not knowing, of suspending prior knowledge in just the same way that Freud recommends we do with respect to each new case.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Lapsus," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 73.

Truth is the substance of the analytic experience – its daily bread, I said. It produces some truth. It holds simply because there are revelations, illuminations, instants of seeing, what anglophones call *insight*. [...] But the truths produced by the analytic experience are mortal, they are situated at the level of the *pathème*, of what is felt, they are the truths that are pathetic. They are variable at this level, which had led Lacan to create the neologism of “*varité*”, a variable truth.

Miller, J.-A., “Psychoanalysis Has a Structure of Fiction,” *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 143.

For Freud, *this unconscious is something real* manifesting itself in perceptible effects, which cause damage, introduce quirks [...] This real is inferred from its effects, via a deciphering, as testified by the question: *What does this mean?* The analytic operation gives meaning to what appears to be devoid of it. This is the semantic dimension.

Miller, J.-A., “Unconscious Knowledge and the Unconscious Subject,” *The Lacanian Review* 17, 2025, p. 25.

[T]he truth effect takes its departure from speech: without speech, no truth effect. And even, without speech, no truth. An act of speech is necessary in order to have something like the truth.

Miller, J.-A., “The Lying Truth,” *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 149.

The question is not so much to know what has been extracted from jouissance, what has been extracted from the fantasy, in terms of truth effects, in terms of knowledge, than to express in speech the satisfaction that I managed to extract from my mode of jouissance. Because my mode of jouissance is what it is.

Miller, J.-A., “The Lying Truth,” *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 154.

Lacan started his very last teaching in his Seminar XX when it became clear to him that reality is approached with the devices of jouissance and that there is no other device of jouissance than language. Lacan realized then that language is a device of and for jouissance, and that it is not made for sense or for truth. Language does not exist to make truth emerge in the real, language is For jouissance.

Miller, J.-A., “The Lying Truth,” *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 154.

The pass of the parlêtre is not about giving a testimony of one's traversal of the fantasy, but it is an elucidation of one's relation to jouissance – how the subject changed in regard to what does not change, i.e. to its mode of jouissance; how did the variations of its truth develop for the subject as its path of lies?

Miller, J.-A., “The Lying Truth,” *The Lacanian Review* 7, 2019, p. 155.

Above all what was said concerns the law of truth, insofar as it is found trapped in the articulation of the signifier with the signified. Even if you attribute the effect of truth to the signifier or the signified, the truth can only be inscribed by its articulation.

Miller, J.-A., “The Real and Semblance,” *Lacanian Ink* 43/44, 2014, p. 67.

According to this conception, the structure is neither an ordered description of reality, nor a theoretical model elaborated apart from experience. [...] Lacan claims to surmount the difference, the opposition, the contradiction he calls the antinomy of these two conceptions of structure, as description and as model, by introducing a third mode for structure by which it is produced within reality itself and determines its effects there. For Lacan, these effects are effects of truth, effects of jouissance, effects of subject, and the truth itself is an effect, the jouissance also and the subject as well.

Miller, J.-A., "Milanese Intuitions 2," *Mental* 12, 2003, p. 5.

Truth cannot be spoken on the imaginary axis, where both parties are symmetrical. In all the examples Freud takes, truth is spoken in getting it wrong. One can only catch hold of the truth by getting it wrong. The quote Freud gives, from the Polonius character in Hamlet, 'your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth,' is very Lacanian. Eventually, this would become Lacan's text, "*La méprise du sujet supposé savoir*."

Miller, J.-A., "Marginalia to 'Constructions in Analysis'," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 22, 2011, p. 64.

The theory of descriptions would like to reduce truth to exactness – that one speak only of that which is and, therefore, that discourse describe the real. This theory would like to track down the discourse that says what is not.

Miller, J.-A., "Ironic Clinic," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 7, 2001, p. 14.

No one, I would say, ever speaks without at the same time saying 'I speak the truth.'

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 14.

[T]ruth speaks through what you say, and this truth says something different from what you want to say.

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 15.

[T]ruth is undefinable within the language one speaks. To define it, one must step outside of that language, as is done in formalized languages which are numbered and hierarchized; at the n+1 level you establish the n-level of truth.

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 15.

If there is such a thing as verification in psychoanalysis, it is within the patient's statements themselves.

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 17.

According to antiquity, [...] truth is related to the real as *adequatio rei intellectus*, correspondence of the thing to the mind. But if the truth is not that at all, nor exactitude, either truth is not related to any real whatsoever, or it is related to the real but by the impossible to say.

Miller, J.-A., "Psychoanalysis, its place among the sciences," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 27, 2013, p. 17.

This is truth in so far as it is closely connected with enigma, which is what he calls truth, strictly speaking. This is not the truth of logic, which he will come to later, the truth that is accommodated by being designated with a small letter. This is the truth that, insofar as it is spoken off to one side, is enveloped in figures, apologies, and clouds. It is the truth that gleams in the shadows, that withers away when it exposes itself.

Miller, J.-A. "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 41.

The Truth-enigma always has dogs as its listeners. This is very precise, even if the truth is obscure: when truth speaks, the listener becomes a dog. He's on the heels of truth. He sniffs, noses about, and then goes bounding off for the kill.

Miller, J.-A. "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 41.

But does a word of truth link up in a chain? First and foremost, truth breaks free from any chain or leash. It throws you into a panic and has to be silenced. Only then does one discover that, in unleashing you against it, you had been held on a leash by truth. In psychoanalysis, this is called negative transference.

Miller, J.-A., "The Logical and the Oracular," *The Lacanian Review* 1, 2016, p. 41.

[T]he reception that the Other gives to what I say has a profound impact on the entry of truth to the real.

Miller, J.-A., "The Space of a Hallucination," *The Lacanian Review* 6, 2018, p. 93.

[T]he concept of language, the earlier concept of speech as communication, as well as the concepts of the big Other, the Name of the Father, and the phallic symbol are all pushed to the point of collapse into semblants.

Miller, J.-A., "Six Paradigms of Jouissance," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 34, 2019, p. 65.

Someone is spoken for – psychoanalysis makes this clear – and, in speaking for someone, there follow the effects of truth which reorganise the subject from top to bottom.

Miller, J.-A., "Six Paradigms of Jouissance," *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 34, 2019, p. 69.

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Instead you have to address the true meaning of what the analysand says within the signifying chain, and the true meaning analytic interpretation has to address is not an effect of signification but rather the product or remainder of the first encounter between the subject and the Other—the remainder of that experience, *das Erlebnis*, in Freudian terms, the remainder of jouissance.

Laurent, É., "Alienation and Separation (II)," *Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, eds. R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 31.

The poetic function reveals that language is not information, but resonance, and emphasizes the matter that links sound and meaning. It reveals what Lacan called *moterialism*, which in its center closes around a void.

Laurent, É., "Interpretation: from Truth to Event," *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 116.

The new signifier raises the act of saying [*le dire*] to the level of an event, like the symptom. [...] “It is in so far as an accurate interpretation *extinguishes* a symptom, that truth is characterized as being poetic.”

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: from Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 132.

Analytic interpretation takes this heterogeneous into account by not only focusing on the word [*parole*] or the statement [*énoncé*]. Beyond its variety of support, it must be guided by the search for a truth effect conceived as a rupture. Its ‘*n'importe quoi*’ is thus not equivalent to any intervention by the psychoanalyst, it must also want to produce an effect of rupture of truth – which is neither simply *adaequatio*, nor the production of any meaning whatever – and take account of the aporias of this aim.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: From Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 118.

The writing is no longer at all what comes to transcribe speech, as a grapheme, in so far as it transcribes what is articulated in speech. It is the writing of the Borromean knots, the writing of RSI, which comes to border the holes of trauma in the body around which all the signifying accounts [*récits*] come to link up in a chain, in its most generalized sense. This unconscious that binds itself is really the unconscious in so far as it is closest to the trauma, to the traumatic emergence.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: From Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 128-129.

In the Saussurean signifier, what serves as writing is the atom which links together the signifier and the signified. Once this link has been exposed as being artificial and given over to the link to be constructed between writing, and speech, then speech finds itself animated by a new dimension, that of the voice that was hidden there. It is the voice which returns in the jaculation as a new use of the signifier.

Laurent, É., “Interpretation: From Truth to Event,” *The Lacanian Review* 8, 2019, p. 130.

To name the case, the demand to speak well, is one of the names of the logic of analytic experience. It directs what the analysand says [*le dire*], his transference, and the interpretative speech [*dire*] of the analyst.

Laurent, É., “The Case, from Unease to the Lie,” *Psychoanalytical Notebooks* 22, 2011, pp. 81-82.

Death, in the saying of science, is a matter of calculating probabilities. It is, in this discourse, what truth it has.

Laurent, É., “Laughing at Norms,” *The Lacanian Review* 13, 2022, p. 122.

